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i 
Abstract 
This thesis submission interrogates the concept of mythology within the opposing 
philosophical frameworks of the world as either an abstract totality from which ‘truth’ 
is derived, or as a chaotic background to which the subject brings a synthetic unity. 
Chapter One compares the culturally dominant, classical philosophical picture of the 
world as a necessary, knowable totality, with the more recent conception of the ‘world’ 
as a series of ideational repetitions (sense) grafted on to material flows emanating 
from a chaotic background (non-sense). Drawing on Plato, Kant, and Heidegger, I 
situate mythology as a conception of the false—that which fails to correlate with the 
‘world’ as a necessary whole. Working with Deleuze, I reconsider the conception of 
mythology from the perspective of absolute contingency—mythology as a set of 
reductive rules or principles which, rather than apprehending the world in its 
hiddenness, instead constitute the world as a series of repetitive, but ultimately 
ideational subjective objects grafted on to a background chaos.  
Chapter Two examines mythology within the perspective of what Deleuze refers to as 
the aleatory moment (the conditions of chance contained within every sensuous ontic 
encounter). Here I introduce the concept of the aleatory circle—an ontically necessary 
foreclosure of the conditions of possibility (the multiplicity) contained in every 
sensuous encounter (or ‘event’). I compare the rules of the game with the ontically 
necessary opening of the conditions of possibility (the aleatory moment or point of 
chance) and its necessary foreclosure as dictated by the rules of time and space. Here I 
introduce the concept of the mythological apparatus—a framework of ideational rules 
derived from the repetitions of the aleatory circle encountered by the subject in its 
sensuous mode. The myth apparatus is, in my view, both constitutive of, and 
constituted by, the ‘world’, governing the position of the subject within a framework 
established by ontic repetition.  
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 1 
Preface 
The conception of mythology that drives current understanding relies on a 
supposition of ‘truth’ derived from the concept of the world as a necessary totality, 
from which emerges the possibility of an understanding of the real as a grounded, 
knowable object. Myth, as conventionally conceived, is the position of the 
abstraction—of the fantastical or false. Epistemological schemes that demand a 
correlative methodology conceive of the ‘world’ as a ground from which knowledge, in 
its expressive mode, may be attained. The truth of the world is therefore singular—a 
homogeneous space that dictates the structural frame by which the subject 
apprehends its necessities. As we will see, however, the history of the structural 
apparatus is also the history of the mythological ground—a metaphysical 
presupposition reliant on a conception of the ‘material’ of the world as a ground from 
which true knowledge emanates. It is through the ‘reality’ of the material that a 
cohesive, totalized and knowable picture of the world is meant to emerge. In this 
regard, mythological thought may be conceived in two ways: 1) as metaphor, 
describing a cohesion of phenomena that intervenes ahead of natural inquiry, 
presenting the world as an abstract totality through logical synthesis of ‘determinate’ 
objects, and 2) as lateral, or fantastical speculation regarding the origin of the ground 
of phenomena.  
    The logic of the mythological apparatus parallels what we will refer to as the natural 
image of thought—a classical conception of knowledge that presupposes the positions 
of truth and falsity within a world comprised of knowable, grounded empirical 
phenomena emanating from a necessary world. The mythological apparatus’ 
character remains sutured to a presupposition of the world as a totality, intervening in 
a constitutive mode ahead of any subjective interpretation of ontic ‘events.’  
     Chapter One of this work discusses the concept of world, examining two opposing 
views: 1) the world as a grounded, knowable totality expressing its necessities, and 2) 
the world as a background chaos, or ‘non-sense’, to which the subject applies rules or 
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judgment. Chapter Two re-views what we refer to as the ‘mythological apparatus’—a 
set of ontic rules ‘determined’ by the false repetition of the same. Here we examine the 
role of chance within an ontic conception, and consider the possibility for subjective 
world-building operating within a background of non-sense. 
Chapter One: The World Picture with Respect to 
Ontological Demarcation 
1.1 An Image of the World  
It seems that whatever we designate as the world must be accessible and adequately 
describable under proper conditions and with a thorough methodology, and yet the 
history of Western philosophy marks the abject failure of this endeavor. Science, as 
the preferred epistemic mode of the late modern period, solidifies the possibility for 
an ‘ontic’ understanding of the world under given conditions, but retains as its first 
postulate the impossibility of knowing the world as an ontological precept and as a 
coherent, self-enclosed whole. Scientism, the belief in the methodology of science, is 
the religion for an age that has largely abandoned the possibility of an ontological 
understanding of the world as a concrete object of knowledge. As such, we pursue 
adequate ontic descriptions,1 favoring a system of cataloguing the modalities of the 
natural world. Magnitude marks the master dialectic of the natural view, a view in 
which empirical phenomena are elevated to the order of world-constructing ahead of 
any notions of a totalized unity. In its difference, the world of becoming instantiates 
an absent totality: the world is comprised of brute fact—a collection or series of real-
existent, yet banal, positive empirical phenomena that, when taken as a ‘whole’, 
represents the fellowship of the human “subjective” experience with its ‘objective’ 
material conditions. The natural view is cautious in its approach, consistently refining 
 
1 I understand ontic as that which is ‘real’ and ‘factual,’ as opposed to ontological—the possibility of the 
‘Being of beings” (see Chapter Two, p.21 footnote for a description of Heidegger’s definitions and my 
usage) 
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its various frameworks and methodologies.2 The world, as such, inhabits a place of a 
fractured totality. It is a subjectively unconstituted field, broken into bits made 
digestible to human cognition. Despite its various contractions and expansions, the 
natural sciences have a tendency toward a notion of truth that predicates the world as 
a concrete totality. There is a teleological bent to the cultural mode of scientific 
inquiry. Despite its various changes, ‘revolutions,’ and retractions, real objective 
knowledge seems to always lie just beyond the horizon. This type of frontierism avoids 
an inconvenient space of confrontation: when every horizon has been crossed, and 
when all the forces which govern our existence have been confronted and catalogued, 
have we really learned anything meaningful about the world as it exists in itself? If I 
master the game of chess, have I come to understand the meaning of chess in its 
entirety? 
     We take another view: the world as it is in itself is a background chaos, a non-
ground from which emanates only a false veneer of a concrete totality. The world, in 
this sense, is fractured at its very beginning. Knowledge is not a great crusade—the 
opening of the world and the conquering of its secrets. It is more of a game—the 
traversing of chaos with a touch of aesthetic flair.3 Plato famously inaugurated a 
concept of the world founded on a model / copy distinction. The question of Being 
saturates Plato’s Sophist.4 The Eleatic Visitor proposes a number of divisions in which 
he attempts to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher. First among them is the 
sophist’s imitative quality. This movement relies on an explicit origin of self-same 
 
2 Gilles Deleuze refers to the dogmatic image of thought specific to the modern era as follows: “all we 
need to think well, and to think truthfully, is a method. Method is an artifice but one through which we 
are brought back to the artifice of thought, through which we adhere to this nature and ward off the 
effect of the alien forces which alter it and distract us. Through method we ward off error. Time and 
place matter little if we apply method: it enables us to enter the domain of “that which is valid for all 
times and places.” See Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), 103.  
3 Here I reference Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “From Chaos to the Brain”, in What is Philosophy?, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 201-218.  
4 Here I tie the notion of Being to that of the world as it exists in itself, as a necessary totality from which 
‘models’ emerge in representation. Plato, as conventionally received, founds his philosophy on the 
expressive nature of the world with respect to Ideas. 
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Being accessible to the dialectician, and made explicit through language.5 The sophist, 
in his imitation, drains the dialectic of any essential Being in favor of the movement of 
images lacking an essential (worldly) ground—which the Visitor refers to as “likeness 
making.”6 The sophist, according to the Visitor, elides truth in favor of a production 
of images with no relation to Being as such. The Visitor’s division of language into the 
philosopher’s speech, with its attendant presence, and the sophist’s, which does not, 
ignores a fundamental tension in ontological inquiry: language penetrates ‘knowledge’ 
of the world, but knowledge cannot deduce Being as a substantial property. It is only, 
according to the Socratic method, through dialogue that Being is made to appear. The 
model from which the sophist derives his copy is hidden. In Phaedrus, Lysias’ oratory 
adopts two distinct metaphysical tones: one of the authentic, of the true with respect 
to Being, and the other as mere sophistry—the form without the content. The former 
conception is reminiscent of the modern dominant cultural view: the world is a place 
of conquest, a knowable but presently hidden, necessary and complete entity within 
which ‘true’ models may be distinguished from ‘false’ copies.7 As Deleuze 
characterizes it: 
The function of the notion of the model is not to oppose the world of 
images in its entirety but to select the good images, the icons which 
resemble from within, and eliminate the bad images or simulacra. 
Platonism as a whole is erected on the basis of this wish to hunt down 
the phantasms or simulacra which are identified with the Sophist 
himself, that devil, that insinuator or simulator, that always disguised 
and displaced false pretender. For this reason it seems to us that, with 
Plato, a philosophical decision of the utmost importance was taken: 
 
5 This mirrors the concept of reification. The world is brought in to being through language. Being, in 
this sense, is a background which ontic existence covers over. It is the job of the dialectician to establish 
authentic Being not in language, but through the confrontation of difference.  
6 Plato. “Sophist”, in Plato Complete Works, 235-293, ed. John M. Cooper, and D. S. Hutchinson, trans. 
Nicholas P. White (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 256. 
7 See Plato, “Phaedrus”, in Plato Complete Works, 506-556, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, 
trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing, 1997). 
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that of subordinating difference to the supposedly initial powers of the 
Same and the Similar, that of declaring difference unthinkable in itself 
and sending it, along with the simulacra, back to the bottomless ocean.8   
Deliverance from the fractured world has taken myriad forms, but the structure of 
belief that has historically served to move humanity toward ‘transcendence’ has 
remained largely the same. There is a fundamental motion within the human spirit, 
one endeavoring to ascend to a forgotten unity of the world together with its 
impoverished corporeal subjects. We observe this in many myths and legends. It is the 
story of the Book of Genesis, and of the fall of man. It is the story of lost unity, of the 
fracture of the world and the loss of togetherness with God.9 The story of the original, 
of the model, is the story of the unity of the subject with the ‘world’ (allegorized as 
God). The father is the original ground that delivers man in to the world, providing 
structure and guiding the subject away from the dangers of the simulacra. The 
sovereign position of God, the father, mirrors that of the sovereign position of Being, 
the creator. This original unity has guided Western thought and remains within 
aspects of the scientific worldview. Derrida characterizes it as follows: “the name of 
man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of 
ontotheology—in other words, throughout his history—has dreamed of full presence, 
the reassuring foundation.”10 
 
8 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1968), 127. 
9 In philosophical terms we refer to togetherness as the adequation of the subject with Being as it exists in 
itself. Being should be understood as an ontological property—a bringing together of the subject with the 
world in an ontologically complete manner. This view is often considered ‘religious’ or mystical, but as 
we shall discuss in Chapter Two, the origins of the myth of Being share a common ground with the 
myth structure of human cognition and relies on the same supposition of the world as a necessary, 
concrete totality from which ‘man has fallen.’ As opposed to this view, the world conceived as a chaotic 
field, or background noise to which the subject brings a fictitious, ‘mythological’ unity, offers a unique 
understanding of the role of myth and what we will refer to as the mythological apparatus in Chapter 
Two, with respect to the ontic/ontological genesis of mythologies.  
10 Jacques Derrida, “Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing and 
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 290. 
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     Despite traces of the (classical) Platonic view remaining in Western metaphysics, 
the question of totality, it seems, has largely been abandoned.11 An emphasis on 
observable, measurable phenomena has separated ‘knowledge’ of the world from an 
understanding of the world as an authentic, knowable totality. As such, allegorical 
myths and legends which have historically provided a defining character of the world 
have been given secondary status—they lack empirical determination; they are based 
in fantasy; they have a ‘scientific’ explanation, etc. The conquest of the world has 
adopted a different tone. We no longer seek the definition of the world through 
mythico-historical means, but rather as a collection of brute facts that comprise a great 
machine of unknown character and origin. As Adorno and Horkheimer note of the 
enlightenment: 
Mimetic, mythical, and metaphysical forms of behavior were 
successively regarded as stages of world history which had been left 
behind, and the idea of reverting to them held the terror that the self 
would be changed back into the mere nature from which it had 
extricated itself with unspeakable exertions and which for that reason 
filled it with unspeakable dread.12 
In its cultural presentation, the ontological world-picture of the scientific age is one of 
confusion. We have, on the one hand, the tools necessary for a rigorous but 
incomplete picture of a world comprised of empirical phenomena and the rules 
 
11 Deleuze emphasizes the ‘non-Platonic’ tone in Plato’s later works, arguing that Plato himself 
understood the fissures in the model/copy distinction. Deleuze writes “The Sophist himself is the being 
of the simulacrum, the satyr or centaur, the Proteus who meddles and insinuates himself everywhere. 
For this reason, it may be that the end of the Sophist contains the most extraordinary adventure of 
Platonism: as a consequence of searching in the direction of the simulacrum and leaning over its abyss, 
Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it 
places in question the very notations of copy and model.” It is possible that Plato succumbed to the 
dialectic and ultimately delivered Western thought over to the primacy of the simulacra. See Deleuze, 
“Appendix 1. The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy,” in The Logic of Sense, 253-279, ed. Mark 
Lester, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 256. 
12 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New 
York: Continuum, 1989), 24. 
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governing them. On the other hand the concept of world has become impoverished—
conceived as a hangover from more dogmatic, uncritical times. The demarcation of 
what constitutes proper knowledge of the world and what is possible to know has been 
made explicit by countless philosophers and scientists. We grasp the limitations of 
human understanding, and along with the conquest of the worldly frontier, focus our 
efforts in other areas. We understand the world in a reduced manner and fail to grasp 
it as an object of relevant inquiry in its own right. This is not to say that myths and 
legends are the safeguard of secret knowledge, containing the keys to a forgotten 
understanding of the world. It is only to comment on the shift in academic tone 
permeating the academy and mass culture. Alongside the notion of a totalized, 
knowable and necessary world, allegories which have historically given rise to the 
definition of the world are entirely suspect. We should consider religious myths as 
categorically similar to the notion of the original model or self-same property and, 
accordingly, afford them the same critical treatment. 
     Commentators of Kant and his successors have lauded his critical project as one of 
delivering philosophy over to ‘science’ in its sharpening of the lines which separate 
“truth” from illusion.13 The whole of philosophy, on this view, adopts a scientific 
quality in its determination of the difference between knowledge of the world and 
pseudo-scientific empirical extrapolation. Whatever phenomena may be, it is argued, 
a definitive line must be drawn between what constitutes the world as a real, semi-
causal, translatable apparatus, and the supplemental subjective ideations the flawed 
human-animal brings to bear upon that world. Kant’s critical project re-situated the 
locus of world to within the ‘universal’ structures of human cognition, inaugurating a 
 
13 Here I consider the preface to The First Critique, wherein Kant is explicit in his aim of the discovery of 
universal structures of human cognition. One of Kant’s strongest contribution, in my view, is the 
distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ deductions, which allowed Kant, notably, in The Third 
Critique, to distinguish between aesthetic (synthetic) and natural (analytic) judgments. See Chapter 
Two, pp.30-31 for a brief introduction to The Third Critique and Kant’s Aesthetic Idea. Truth, in this 
reduced sense, is the name given to the proper representation, or correlation of the subject with the 
object, which Kant sought to demarcate from fantasies of the Ideal.  
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critique of the metaphysics of Being and of the Cartesian I. As Adorno and 
Horkheimer note: 
Kant combined the doctrine of thought’s restlessly toilsome progress 
toward infinity with insistence on its insufficiency and eternal 
limitation. The wisdom he imparted is oracular: There is no being in 
the world that knowledge cannot penetrate, but what can be penetrated 
by knowledge is not being.14 
In Kant the picture of the world is radically transformed. Being no longer enjoys a 
privileged status within the context of universally valid structures of thought. We refer 
to Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ as the re-situating of the world to within the subject, 
absent the cohesion of the Cartesian I. The world is a site of transcendental illusion 
and error, with only the subject bringing unity to chaos. As Adorno and Horkheimer 
note: “the transcendental subject of knowledge, as the last reminder of subjectivity, is 
itself seemingly abolished and replaced by the operations of the automatic 
mechanisms of order, which therefore run all the more smoothly.”15 
     Natural science enjoys the privileged position of a metaphysics which presents as a 
non-metaphysics: a collection of methodologies under which the truth conditions of 
the world may be adequately fulfilled (in time) because they have been reduced to the 
point of the elimination of a large section of human subjective experience, and, as I 
will argue, of the conditions which give rise to the picture of the world itself. For 
Heidegger “metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of 
what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis 
upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the 
phenomena that distinguish the age.”16 On the assumptions made within the scientific 
 
14 (Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 19) 
15 Ibid., 23. 
16 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1977), 115. 
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worldview, the precepts of its metaphysics intervenes as a framework ahead of any 
individual interpretation of the world. The scientific world-picture marks the 
systematic erasure of the indeterminate. Incomplete phenomena like dreams, myths, 
legends, etc. are relegated to the position of fantasy—a grouping of often spectacular 
but ultimately meaningless distractions from any ‘authentic’ understanding of the 
world. Here, criticism of the interpretation of ‘immaterial’ phenomena adopts the 
position of a warning against the dangers of a naïve idealism—of equating chaotic 
phenomenal touchstones as ontologically similar in kind to representations of 
empirical substance. As such, the scientific world-picture often engenders a type of 
hostility to that which seemingly lacks empirical determination.  
     The inclusion of ‘mythological’ interpretations as a relevant area of inquiry follows 
a conception of world based on the traditional model / copy formulation. If the world 
is, as classically conceived, a discrete totality capable of expressing its ‘essential’ 
properties, then mythological thought falls into the category of the false. If, on the 
other hand, what we consider as the world marks an ideal synthesis—a synthetic 
construction blending empirical experience with transcendental interpretation—then 
mythological thought adopts a different tone. It is, in this way, elevated to an 
ontological status similar to phenomena ‘perceived’ in representation.17  
     Markus Gabriel notes, “anything we encounter in the world and to which we are 
capable of referring by some singular term, i.e. anything to which we concede 
existence, is part of a certain domain.”18 The relevant domains we concede to the 
natural sciences are those that present possible empirical determination. As a cultural 
motif, scientism suffers the unfortunate distinction of believing in science as a type of 
messianic productive apparatus—a type of world-constructing mechanism that brings 
 
17 I refer here to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of psychoanalysis and its relation to myth. See Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “Savages, Barbarians, Civilized Men,” 139-272, in Anti-Oedipus, trans. 
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). 
18 Markus Gabriel, Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism (London: 
Continuum International Publishing, 2009), 15. 
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‘objective’ fact into the subjective view. Scientism tends to neglect ‘non-sense’—that 
which fails to cohere with an ontic frame that is itself established through fine-tuning 
of the metaphysical scientific apparatus.19  The importance of phenomena that fall 
outside its stated domain of interrogation tend to be pathologized or mythologized in 
such a way as to drain them of any ‘real’ meaning. These myths amount to 
transcendental illusion or biological malfunction and, as such, are relegated to a 
particular domain of knowledge that carries secondary status to the ‘hard sciences.’ 
     The scientific world-picture appears to be inadequate to the task of forming a 
conception of world as a concrete totality. If we consider Gabriel’s definition of the 
world as a set of domains, then it follows that the domain of all domains—the world—
should emerge as an area of inquiry into which human cognition may make some 
progress. Speculative ontological systems have offered brilliant images of the world, 
but have failed to ground their systems adequately to the world as a totality. Through 
the various movements of philosophies of fundamental ontology, through 
epistemology, and finally through philosophies of difference, Western thought has 
attempted to situate the world conceptually by defining the play of phenomena 
against a speculative background of a given type. The teleological negative of Hegel, 
Deleuze’s transcendental-empiricism, Plato’s One, are different names for the World 
as an incomplete conceptual field from or within which productive phenomena 
proceed. Despite the variations found within the tradition. and with few exceptions, 
the World remains a complex, presently unknowable entity within which human 
cognition has emerged. As Gabriel characterizes it: “Despite the turbulent rapture we 
 
19 The question of sense is best penetrated by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense, specifically in his discussion 
on the work of Lewis Carroll (Alice both “grows” and “shrinks” at once.). Writes Deleuze: “A false 
proposition remains no less a proposition endowed with sense. Non-sense would then be the 
characteristic of that which can be neither true nor false. Two dimensions may be distinguished in a 
proposition: expression, in which a proposition says or expresses some idea; and designation, in which 
it indicates or designates the objects to which what is said or expressed applies.” (Gilles Deleuze, The 
Logic of Sense, ed. Mark Lester, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990), 153. 
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experience in our personal life and despite the utter contingency of the roles we play, 
there ultimately is a background in front of which we enact our lives.”20  
     We have, in various times, witnessed attempts to ground phenomena within a 
concrete totality, providing definition for the character of the world as it exists in 
itself. Attempts to situate the world in an ontologically and epistemologically 
sufficient manner have constantly returned philosophy to its perennial questions. 
That which is supposed to ground experience or intuition in Being (as world), whether 
the ‘material,’ time, or otherwise, eludes the prospect of a complete determination. It 
seems that under the weight of becoming, Being is radically effaced. As Nietzsche put 
it, “the idea that everything becomes show us the vanity of Being.”21 The capture and 
cataloguing of the various modes of becoming mark the domain, or domains, of 
relevant inquiry pursued in the natural sciences. These are quantitative or qualitative 
advancements of a representative apparatus whose correlate is supposed as ‘the world’. 
Objects of relevant inquiry, whether in physics, biology, the social sciences, etc. take as 
their point of departure a grounding frame established first as a metaphysical 
structure (i.e.: empiricism). The world as a concept fades to the background as the 
frame which provides the natural sciences its justification in ‘world-building’ is 
reinforced. ‘The vanity of Being’, as Nietzsche put it, is the pretension of any inquiry 
into the world, whether philosophical or otherwise, that it may come to know Being as 
such. As Schelling argued: “Every organic individual exists, as something that has 
become, only through another, and in this respect is dependent according to its 
becoming but by no means according to its Being.”22 In this sense the natural sciences, 
whose ground is the cataloguing and proper re-presentation of the modalities of 
becoming, lacks privileged access to Being or the world as such.    
 
20 (Gabriel, 28) 
21 Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted in Gilles Deleuze, What is Grounding?, transcript by Pierre Lefebvre, 
trans. Arjen Kleinherenbrink, ed. Tony Yanick, Jason Adams, and Mohammad Salemy (Grand Rapids: 
&&& Publishing, 2015), 81. 
22 F.W.J Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and 
Johannes Schmidt (New York: SUNY, 2006), 17. 
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     The natural sciences aim at the forces underwriting phenomena with respect to 
governing laws. As Schelling notes: 
The direction of all natural activity will aim toward mean products, 
toward materials which are absolutely compostable and absolutely 
decomposable at once, and permanent processes will appear in Nature 
(as object), through which the incompostable is constantly 
decomposed, and the indecomposable constantly composed.23 
Understood philosophically, laws of nature represent the determination of the 
fluctuations of the natural world picture—no final product, only the force that 
underwrites phenomena as such. In Schelling’s work on the philosophy of nature 
(naturphilosophie) he emphasizes the possibility of driving forces determining 
quantitative modalities expressed by nature. It is not an ontological but an ontic chaos 
which determines the constant state of becoming observed in the natural world.  
Since each actant is highly individual, and since each strives to produce 
what it must produce according to its nature, this will furnish the dram 
of the struggle in which not force entirely conquers the other nor 
completely submits to the other. The egotism of each individual actant 
must join itself to that of the others; what is produced is a product of 
the subordination of all under one and one under all, i.e.: the most 
complete mutual subordination. No individual potency could produce 
the whole or itself, but all together can produce it. The product does 
not lie in the individual, but in the all together, for it is indeed itself 
nothing other than the external phenomenon or the visible expression 
 
23 F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson (New 
York: SUNY Press, 2003), 32. (My emphasis) 
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of that constantly operating combination and decomposition of 
elements.24 
The characterizing and cataloguing of infinite flows of seemingly fixed laws does not 
represent an adequate picture of the world, as Schelling notes. The totality of the 
world consists not only in the movement of phenomena and the rules that underwrite 
their actions, but also the domain within which these flows occur. In Schelling’s 
naturphilosophie, the governing structure of becoming is not the qualitative or 
qualitative modalities of overlapping, mutual or contradictory expressions, but is 
instead the necessity of an a priori natural apparatus from which necessary causes that 
give rise to the effects as experienced in human cognition. Schelling aims at the forces 
which ‘drive’ the compulsions discovered in nature. He notes: “This drive will not be 
free in its direction; its direction is determined for it by the universal hierarchy; there 
is, as it were, a sphere circumscribed for it in advance, beyond whose limits it can 
never step and into which it constantly returns.”25 
     The sphere circumscribed in advance are the rules of the ontic game, and represents 
the ‘structure’ from which natural fluctuations ‘become.’ We understand games as 
philosophical construction. A game is a structured totality within which mathematical 
or interpretive ‘moves’ operate in free play. In a sense, the rules of the game operate as 
an a priori governing structure not unlike the ‘rules’ of the natural world. The rules for 
the game of chess, for example, fabricate a ‘structure’ within, or through which a set of 
ontic possibilities are created. These possibilities are not ‘real’ in the way we classically 
understand the term. They are grounded only by the conditions of possibility created 
by the structure of the rule set. The set of rules governing the movement of chess 
pieces is a fabrication. Though the game, with its inexplicably large number of moves, 
counter-moves, strategies, and possibilities, plays out in the ‘real world,’ we 
understand that in the absence of the rule-set, nothing of consequence would have 
 
24 Ibid., 33. 
25 Ibid., 34. 
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occurred. In much the same way, the ontic rules which govern the various processes of 
becoming expressed in the natural world mirrors the logical structure of the 
preconditions of the game. As such, were we to establish the first causes, or necessary 
structure, of the ontic game, it still would not constitute an adequate picture of the 
world as it exists in its totality. Whatever forces drive the conditions of free play found 
within the game of chess, and despite the presupposition of a structured totality with 
respect to governing rules, it is apparent that whatever lies beyond the game of chess is 
an inaccessible domain unexplainable absent the rules of the game itself. Natural 
science is pursuit of the mastery of the ontic game. It cannot consider the domain 
within which the authentic meaning of the world comes in to view, much in the same 
way theology and philosophy, in their speculative modes, fall short of the task.26  
Deleuze characterizes human games as follows: 
First, human games presuppose pre-existing categorical rules. Second, 
these rules serve to determine the probabilities – in other words, the 
winning and losing ‘hypotheses’. Third, these games never affirm the 
whole of chance: on the contrary, they fragment it and, for each case, 
subtract or remove the consequences of the throw from chance, since 
they assign this or that loss or gain as though it were necessarily tied to 
a given hypothesis.27 
A rule set given by positivist science always complies with a governing principle—a 
frame of postulates that defines a specific mode of inquiry. Absent metaphysical 
 
26 Philosophy has an advantage over both theology and the natural sciences in this regard. As I note in 
Chapter Two, the adherence to rigorous analysis of the breadth of human experience has allowed 
philosophy to glimpse the ontological, not as substantial Being coming in to view, but as pure possibility. 
Whereas theology sutures the rift separating the ontological with the ontic with moral imperatives, 
philosophy aims, in a systematic manner, at the conditions of possibility which give rise to concepts of 
Being and of the world as objects of relevant inquiry, thus opening a field of questions which provide 
definition to the world in a lateral way.  
27 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1968), 282.. 
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presuppositions, or what we have referred to as the rules of the game, the world 
descends into ‘non-sense’, with only a corporeally grounded fixed point of reference 
persisting in time and space. Deleuze notes: 
Nothing is more fragile than the surface. Is not this secondary 
organization threatened by a monster even more awesome than the 
Jabberwocky—by a formless, fathomless nonsense, very different from 
what we previously encountered in the two figures still inherent to 
sense? At first, the threat is imperceptible, but a few steps suffice to 
make us aware of an enlarged crevice; the whole organization of the 
surface has already disappeared, overturned in a terrible primordial 
order. Nonsense no longer gives sense, for it has consumed everything. 
We might have thought at first that we were inside the same element, 
or in a neighboring element. But we see now that we have changed 
elements, that we have entered the storm.28 
Deleuze splits corporeal actions, modes, and sensations (causes) from incorporeal 
effects. Sense proceeds over the surface, providing unity to the world. In its absence, 
the world fragments. There can no longer be a distinction between true and false, only 
the movement of pure becoming instantiated by the corporeal. As Deleuze writes: 
In this collapse of the surface, the entire world loses its meaning. It 
maintains perhaps a certain power of denotation, but this is 
experienced as empty. It maintains a certain power of manifestation, 
but this is experienced as indifferent. And it maintains a certain 
signification, experienced as “false.” Nevertheless, the word loses its 
sense, that is, its power to draw together or to express an incorporeal 
 
28 (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 82) 
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effect distinct from the actions and passions of the body, and an 
ideational event distinct from its present realization.29 
With respect to the fragmentation of the world absent a given ruleset, two cultural 
views have emerged: systems of thought which cohere with ‘reality’—the underwriting 
laws which govern the rules of the game, and frameworks of “mythology”—
speculative constructions meant to provide definition of the world as such. What 
motivates my work in Chapter One is to provide definition to the world as a domain 
of relevant inquiry. In Chapter Two I chart the conditions of possibility for the creation 
of what I refer to as the mythological apparatus—a type of ontic / ontological world-
building frame grounded in the multiplicity contained in every sensuous encounter 
with the world. In my view, the concept of the world as a necessary, totalized object 
from which emanates expressive phenomena that a subject may apprehend is not 
coherent with what is given in ontic experience. Failures to ground positive 
phenomena in essential Being have been consistently spurred, I argue, because our 
concept of world has not been sufficiently updated to account for the radical 
contingency of the event and of ontic experience in general.30  
1.2 Fragmentation of the World  
To consider the world in its absolute totality is to digress from what is given in ontic 
experience. The everydayness of the individual is punctuated by a break from real-
existing epistemic certainty in its failure to grasp concrete objects. When Plato seeks 
Being in the dialectic he seeks a definition of the world which is not present, 
expressive, or manifested, but hidden—a secret knowledge to be gleaned by skillful 
logical moves. This classic conception of the subject-position remains in Western 
thought today. It presupposes the world of totality in advance of ‘subjective’ 
apprehension. Kant famously overturned this logic. His ‘Copernican revolution’ re-
 
29 Ibid., 87. 
30 See Chapter Two for a discussion on the character of the event, its relation to the ontic / ontological, 
and what Deleuze refers to as the aleatory point.  
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situated the world to within the subject in the form of a critique of the a priori 
conditions of possibility that give rise to apprehension of ‘the world’ in the first 
instance. Kant sought the universal, and hence, necessary preconditions which govern 
the various faculties of knowledge. The a priori conditions of possibility developed 
conceptually by Kant fractured the world itself. The self-same Being emanating from a 
world of necessity has, post Kant, become a latent conceptual illusion formulated by 
the various faculties. Kant did maintain the possibility of wholly determinate concepts 
of nature which, properly appraised, might render the world, as a collection of things 
in themselves, knowable.31 For Kant, reason differs from aesthetic judgment in that 
ideas bear some trace (or sign) of nature (which Kant refers to as ground “for lawful 
correspondence” with our satisfaction). The conditions that give rise to 
correspondence are found in the field of representation. As such, the world is 
constituted not as a set of hidden phenomena expressing a necessary totality, but as a 
grouping of natural laws that may fail to find correspondence in the a priori 
‘transcendental’ structures of the subject. Kant’s revolution is what has allowed 
Deleuze to argue that “representation is a site of transcendental illusion.”32  
     Knowledge of the world, whether derived from its particulars, or as a concrete 
totality within which human cognition persists, begins with the question of grounding. 
In a post-Kantian framework, grounding should be understood as the conformity of 
things in themselves (the “in-itself) with their adequate representation and possible re-
creation as expressed by the world and apprehended by the subject (things as they are 
“for them-selves”). Kant’s critical project re-situated the locus of possible 
understanding of the world as an expressive totality to within the mediative universal 
‘transcendental’ structures of the subject. As Deleuze notes: “for Kant the form of the 
 
31 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 160. 
32 (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 265) 
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illusion (of thought) is more profound. He wants to reach the transcendental root.”33  
For an adequate picture of the world to persist, the task of philosophy following Kant 
has been the universal attainment of a picture of the world beyond finitude. In sum, by 
short-circuiting the fundamental principles of mediation, representation, reflection, 
etc., modern philosophy has attempted to regain a picture of the world that seeks to 
overcome the limitations defined by Kant. In order to adequately ground a picture of 
the world, we have witnessed the rise of so-called ‘speculative realist’ philosophy. This 
brand of thought takes as its starting point the world as it presents itself in a positive 
manner. We consider this line of inquiry, grounded in experience of the ontic, as 
constructing the world in a way that departs from the classical philosophical 
conception of the world as a necessary totality. As such, it is more in line with inquiry 
pursued by the natural sciences—a focus on the world as a construction of positive 
modalities and the laws governing their possibilities.  
     The structure of subjective apprehension of the world has made only minor 
changes since Kant’s Copernican revolution. Accordingly, philosophical and scientific 
descriptions of the world tend to develop under a methodological rubric distrustful of 
aesthetic, (synthetic) concepts derived of phenomenal experience. At its core, natural 
science is a mode of inquiry aimed at positive phenomena but only as ‘effect’. 
Governing laws that set the parameters of ‘surface’ possibility make up the 
constellation of real-existing objects considered for scientific review. The re-
presentation of Ideas, as such, forms a singular line from its epistemological center 
toward a conclusive determination regarding its point of genesis. As with the game of 
chess, the rules governing the structure of the natural world produce significant 
variation—complex emergent phenomena that lack an analytic relation to the law 
(rule) that is supposed to have formed it in the first instance. This dynamic produces a 
picture of the world with an ‘a priori’ rule-set meant that are meant to explain, but not 
 
33 Gilles Deleuze, What is Grounding, From transcript notes taken by Pierre Lefebvre, trans. Arjen 
Kleinherenbrink, ed. Tony Yanick, Jason Adams, and Mohammad Salemy (Grand Rapids: &&& 
Publishing, 2015), 116. 
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contain, the variable possibilities of play.34 As with Kant’s attempt to reach the 
transcendental root, the game of chess analogy serves another purpose: to displace the 
question of first causes in favor of an adequate description of the structural forces that 
govern the rules of play, offering predictions as to the variability of possible outcomes.  
     A problem persists: the center point which serves as the proper beginning of any 
adequate scientific explanation regarding particulars in the world is never fully self-
contained. No entity contains, as an analytic determination, its essence within its 
phenomenal expression. As Derrida writes: “One cannot determine the center and 
exhaust its totalization because the sign which replaces the center, which supplements 
it, taking the center’s place in its absence—this sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a 
supplement.”35 The concept of a structured totality is, accordingly, the concept of the 
single point of reference predicated on a self-same property.36 We might refer to this 
property as the originary real-existing center-point from which Ideas proceed. 
Derrida characterizes it as such: “The concept of centered structure is in fact the 
concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a 
fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of 
play.”37 The supplemental nature of an ideational concept presents as a self-same 
certitude regarding a particular phenomenon’s essence. As Deleuze writes: “A is A as a 
proposition is true and gives us the form of identity, of every analytical proposition.’38 
As a point of center, A marks a given phenomenon as a self-enclosed entity. This is 
the free play of surface effects, absent a necessary link to a determining world.  
     However, and as Derrida noted, A is also the form of a proper name that is already 
a metaphor: representation marks the intervention of the ‘transcendental’ upon 
 
34 See Gilles Deleuze, “Sixth Series on Serialization,” in The Logic of Sense, ed. Mark Lester, trans. 
Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 36-41. 
35 Jacques Derrida, “Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing and 
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1980), 289.  
36 Cf. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp.301-303. 
37 (Derrida, Writing and Difference, 279) 
38 (Deleuze, What is Grounding, 102) 
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whatever eludes the subject in its absolute certainty. The world as presentational 
phenomena is supposed to contain within its expression an analytic determination—
one based on a necessary totalized and knowable world. States Derrida: 
…the proper names are already no longer proper names, because their 
production is already their obliteration, because the erasure and the 
imposition of the letter are originary, because they do not supervene 
upon a proper inscription; it is because the proper name has never 
been, as the unique appellation reserved for the presence of a unique 
being, anything but the original myth of a transparent legibility present 
under the obliteration; it is because the proper name was never possible 
except through its functioning within a classification and therefore 
within a system of differences, within a writing retaining the traces of 
difference, that the interdict was possible, could come into play, and 
when the time came, as we shall see, could be transgressed; 
transgressed, that is to say restored to the obliteration and the non-self-
sameness (non-proprieté) at the origin.39     
Self-sameness marks the ground of particulars that comprises the picture of the world. 
Ontic inquiry imposes an imposition: to name A as a self-enclosed, positive entity 
that, in its co-mingling, opposition, change, etc. becomes an object of legitimate 
thought. The destruction of the logic of the self-same entity proceeding over the 
surface of the world returns us to non-sense and to the chaotic background within 
which we seek a determinate ground. Hence, in The Logic of Sense Deleuze can 
separate the incorporeal (sense) from the corporeal only as an ontic line of inquiry. 
 
39 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998) ,109. 
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The ‘structure’ of the world, absent surface ‘effects’ dissolves into a chaotic, 
inaccessible morass within which all human cognition is dissolved.4041 
     Our task here is not to discredit the scientific world-view, but instead to offer a 
supplement in the form of a critique of its underlying suppositions. My concern is 
not, as yet, with the positive representation of the particulars of the world, whether as 
real-existing self-enclosed entities, simulacra, or otherwise. What concerns me here is, 
for the moment, the background within which positive phenomena emerge. Following 
Kant and his successors, I concern myself with the transcendental root of the domain 
of the world itself. As Gabriel noted, unless we concede to an absolute embrace of 
nothingness, we are forced to make at least one grand presupposition: there is a 
background, some negative which is essential to the world, one which produces 
positive instantiations of particular phenomena, structured by time in space, 
governing human subjective experience. In more theological terms, Schelling writes:  
After the eternal act of self-revelation, everything in the world is, as we 
see now, rule, order and form; but anarchy still lies in the ground, as if 
it could break through once again, and nowhere does it appear as if 
order and form were what is original but rather as if initial anarchy had 
been brought to order. This is the incomprehensible base of reality in 
things, the indivisible remainder, that which with the greatest exertion 
cannot be resolved in understanding but rather remains eternally in the 
ground. The understanding is born in the genuine sense from that 
 
40 It is worth noting that Deleuze does approach the subject of world within The Logic of Sense. Alain 
Badiou, in Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, notes that Deleuze is fundamentally committed to a picture of 
the world as a single, “univocal” object (alternatively the ‘plane of immanence’). See Alain Badiou, 
Deleuze, The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2000).  
41 Deleuze refers to the subject-position absent the ‘sense’ of the world as the position of the 
schizophrenic. See his discussion on the work of Antonin Artaud and Lewis Carroll in “Thirteenth Series 
of the Schizophrenic and the Little Girl,” in The Logic of Sense. pp.82-93. 
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which is without understanding. Without this preceding darkness 
creatures have no reality; darkness is their necessary inheritance.42 
On this view the background world as picture necessarily cannot come in to focus. 
The chaotic flows that form the background over which all positive phenomena 
emerge engenders an understanding of the purely ideal type. The grounding of 
positive phenomena in a totalized and necessary world, in this frame, is given over to 
a different quality of the universe: chaos.  
     In its most radical form, the picture of the world as chaos drains all essential ontic 
realisms of the world, repositioning Ideas as ideational constructions. As Deleuze and 
Guattari note:  
All that the association of ideas has ever meant is providing us with 
these protective rules—resemblances, contiguity, causality—which 
enable us to put some order into ideas, preventing our “fantasy” 
(delirium, madness) from crossing the universe in an instant, 
producing winged horses and dragons breathing fire.43 
If chaotic, the background over which the play of positive phenomena emerge 
engenders an ultimate non-totality. The picture of the world, as such, fragments in to 
as many pieces, leaving the grasping subject to a field comprised of illusion and error. 
As Deleuze notes: “Do not count on thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it 
thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an encounter with that which forces 
thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a 
passion to think.”44  
 
42 (Schelling, Freedom Essay, 29) (my emphasis) 
43 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 201-202. 
44 (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 139)  
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     For an adequate picture of the world to emerge, the thing that forces the subject to 
think becomes a central concern. Positive phenomena cannot, it seems, emerge 
sporadically into whatever mode of apprehension we believe as primary. If indeed the 
material of an “outside” consists of an essence, and if indeed our apprehension thereof 
consists in a mediated form of representation, then the scientific worldview is on the 
right track. However, the inadequacy of a metaphysics of non-mediation relies on a 
large supposition, namely, that the noumenon supposedly correlated in thought enjoys 
a quality of non-thought whose representation is self-same with some correlating 
substance of the mind. The mind, as the mediating mechanism within which material 
objects become ‘themselves’ in a representative image would have to disown any 
possibility of epistemological error. In short, self-same properties would be 
apprehended as given without need for recourse to an epistemological framework 
within which these properties make sense. Things would be in-themselves and for 
themselves—the subject merely a means of apprehension. A quick glance around the 
room reveals this is definitely not the case. Simple objects like plant, or computer 
operate as metonymies—placeholders that reduce massive complexity to a short-hand 
understanding providing relevance to the subject. Ideas like plant or computer do 
share a definite phenomenal coherence, however, which supplies an illusion of 
structural necessity. In this way, an object of concern to a subject maintains an 
interactive quality. We understand that plant and computer do not enjoy a necessary 
structural link—they enjoy no positive phenomenal interaction (outside of an 
“accident”). They are incommensurate. However, the singular nature given by 
incommensurability does not in itself demonstrate the discreteness of the object in 
question. Each plant and each computer suffers the same lack of grounding as any 
positive structural relation between the two.  
1.3 The World as Being 
The most sustained attempt at grounding the world was convincingly offered by 
Heidegger in Being in Time (1927), where he argues for a ground of Being within. 
Heidegger’s strategy charts Dasein (being-there), as a primary “subject,” existing both 
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as its world and “in” the world itself. Heidegger takes up the Kantian challenge and 
inverts the subject-object dichotomy that had previously served to limit possible 
understanding of the world in its concrete totality. As opposed to a world-picture of 
the negative, Heidegger proposes Dasein as a positive instantiation whose privileged 
access to logos allows for a world-picture both grounded and essential. As Heidegger 
characterizes it: “only because the “senses” belong ontologically to a being whose kind 
of being is an attuned being-in-the-world can they be “touched” and “have a sense” 
for something so that what touches them shows itself in an affect.”45 Dasein’s 
fundamental attunement does not, for Heidegger, look directly at the things in 
themselves. Rather, in its “turning away,” Dasein discovers Being through its ‘average 
everydayness.’ This mode of discovery is reminiscent of a Platonic understanding of 
Being, but whereas Plato posited the genesis of Being as emanating from an 
otherworldly One, Heidegger situates Being within the world itself as a fundamental 
existential property, grounded in the structure of temporality.  
     Heidegger’s strategy in Being and Time is to separate authentic from inauthentic 
modes of Dasein’s Being, but he is careful to remove any onto-theological 
suppositions. In its inauthentic form, Dasein has not fallen from a purer, otherworldly 
or perfect Being. Rather, Dasein has “fallen prey to the world which itself belongs to 
its being.”46 Heidegger is insistent on proposing Dasein as world. A unique picture of 
the world emerges: free from any metaphysical supposition regarding an out there, 
Dasein becomes the essential primordial fact of existence, leaving behind any chaotic 
negative or background over which the subject emerges.  
     The fracture of the world is still present within Being and Time. Heidegger’s split of 
authentic from inauthentic Being allows him to further a system in which the picture 
of the world remains phenomenally inaccessible, but maintains the possibility of a 
possible totalized vision of Being: 
 
45 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY, 2010), 137. 
46 (Heidegger, Being and Time, 176) 
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To put it negatively, it is beyond question that the totality of the 
structural whole is not to be reached phenomenally by means of 
cobbling together elements. …the being of Dasein (which supports the 
structural whole as such), becomes “accessible” by completely looking 
through this whole at a primordially unified phenomenon which 
already lies in the whole in such a way that it is the ontological basis for 
every structural moment in its structural possibility. 
What is relevant for our inquiry is Heidegger’s re-situating of the subject to a primary 
position within the ontological order. Rather than assume a chaotic background, in 
Being and Time Heidegger opens a space in which apprehension of phenomenal 
Being becomes possible.  
1.4 The Ontic / Ontological Suppositions of Myth  
Whatever the world is, whether totality or chaotic background, some thing forces us 
to think. We can provisionally define the world as a domain within which 
phenomenal contact proceeds. As opposed to a conception of world relying on the 
necessity of its positive phenomena, we consider the world to be, at least in its 
provisional definition, a field comprised of epistemologically inaccessible rules that 
give rise to ontic experience. If the world is the domain of all domains it must, by 
definition, include what we have referred to as the ontological (the Being of all beings). 
It is entirely possible that Being marks a concept of pure fantasy or illusion—a surplus 
constructed by the imagination in order to suture the persistent lack of sensuous with 
any greater meaning. The interpretive mode of human cognition, nonetheless, 
persists. Its point of genesis, in our view, is the absurdity of the dynamic that encloses 
each subjective relation to the world: the question of the necessity of existence at its 
very beginning. “Why is there something rather than nothing?” has been the final 
problematic of many philosophers, and indeed, by any metric of human 
understanding, an oddity that such a thing as the world should exist. Religious and 
technocratic dogma has pursued this question in wild speculatives move, often taking 
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as their starting position the ontic ‘world’ as it is perceived.47 The preference for 
knowledge of first causes has offered up both onto-theological and scientific 
explanations. The latter mode has been quick to diminish the veracity of myth or 
legend, while the former tends to suffer unfortunate elaborations on unverifiable 
claims.  
     Mythologies, as opposed to positive scientific explanations for existence, however, 
tend to exploit a blind spot persistent in human experience. In mythology, something 
of an over-saturation takes place. Judgements of an aesthetic quality tend to guide 
foreclosures on the meaning structure of myths or legends. What is lost in this 
calculation is the richness of world-historical phenomena as they were presented to a 
given subject or set of subjects within bodies and situated in time and space. Lévi-
Strauss poses the following question: “If the content of a myth is contingent, how are 
we going to explain the fact that myths throughout the world are so similar?”48 A 
world of radical contingency would mark disparate and non-linear phenomena 
presenting in unaccountable ways and yet, throughout the world structurally similar 
images persist in the mode of mythology. As Lévi-Strauss describes it: “But what gives 
myth an operational value is that the specific pattern described is timeless; it explains 
the present and the past as well as the future.”49 It is tempting to discount myth as a 
complete ideation or as an aesthetic construction of synthetic propositions. The 
question for the present work is to ask whether mythological thought, as classically 
conceived, illuminates any essential knowledge about the world as such. Despite our 
differing conceptual frameworks, it does appear as though, historically, a variety of 
‘myths’ across disparate cultures contain a semblance of likeness, enough to warrant 
the question of their necessity. It is also possible, as Kant’s project demonstrates, that 
 
47 See Nick Bostrom, “Are you Living in a Computer Simulation?” in Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 53, 
No. 211, 243-255, 2003. simulation-argument.com. Accessed July 17, 2017. http://www.simulation-
argument.com/simulation.html.  
48 Claude Lévi-Strauss, “The Structural Study of Myth,” in Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire 
Jacobson (New York and London: Basic Books, 1963), 208. 
49 (Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 209) 
 27 
‘universal’ subjective faculties give rise to similar mythologies. If true, the ground 
from which these myths appear should be elevated to the status of a structurally 
necessary, universal ontic object and a natural space for inquiry. Myths operating as 
metaphor, for example, could describe, in a stylistic way, ‘real’ phenomena necessary 
to the human-subjective mode of existence. Whether this dynamic says anything 
about the world as the domain of domains, as pure Being, or as the 
meaningful/meaning-giving entity within which subjective experience plays out, is 
another question.  
     In his anatomy of myth, Lévi-Strauss writes that the true constituent units of myth 
are not isolated relations but bundles of such relations, and it is only “as bundles that 
these relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a meaning.”50 The 
primary mode of structural mythology is to offer a universal structure of meaning 
under which the subject applies particulars. As a master reference, the myth 
(structure) serves as a metaphysical frame under which concrete particulars come into 
being. Much in the same mode of thought compared in Plato above, this logic relies 
on a necessary totality from which is derived existential ‘meaning.’ In the same 
manner as engendered by the scientific worldview, structural mythology intervenes 
ahead of the subject, creating the ground over which representational phenomena are 
interpreted. The frame sets the point of reference from which meaning is derived. It is 
the self-same thing that underwrites phenomenal experience and supplies unity under 
a regime of apparent chaos. What differs in a mythological worldview, compared with 
that of the scientific worldview, is the admissibility of ontically ‘groundless’ 
phenomena—illusions and fantasy are given the same ontological status as “facts” of 
the world.51 These are moral and philosophical ‘decisions’ that impose a leading 
postulate. In other words, it is the radical fixing of an original, self-same object from 
which a structure is erected. A confusion generally persists in this dynamic: 
 
50 (Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 211) 
51 See Chapter Two for a reconstruction of the mythological apparatus from the position of the ontic-
ontological. 
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paradoxical or incommensurate ontic facts which contravene the original supposed 
self-same object of reference adopt a threatening quality: they oppose not just the 
original ground, but the structure constructed on its shoulders. When A is no longer 
purely A, the apparatus which binds together sense fractures, along with the ‘world’ it 
had previously constituted.52 
     Mythology is predicated on an originary, self-same and essential product from 
which abstractions are made possible. The mythological worldview tends toward a 
closed ontology, admitting complex phenomena only with reference to the confines of 
its historical precedents. In this sense the predication of an original object or event 
that precipitated the dissemination of a given myth adopts the quality of a dogmatism. 
The belief in an original event provides the myth structure its justification. Because 
the original meaning is supposedly derived a sensuous experience, it is taken on faith 
as a factual ground.  
     The reliance on self-same phenomena lends to the criticism of structural 
mythology. Mythology often adopts the character of completion—a belief in the 
certainty of an enclosed, self-same, ‘infinite’ event or property pervades the structure 
of myth. As Nietzsche notes: 
Here one can certainly admire humanity as a mighty architectural 
genius who succeeds in erecting the infinitely complicated cathedral of 
concepts on moving foundations, or even, one might say, on flowing 
water; admittedly, in order to rest on such foundations, it has to be like 
a thing constructed from cobwebs, so delicate that it can be carried off 
on the waves and yet so firm as not to be blown apart by the wind.53 
 
52 A large question looms over this dynamic: in Chapter Two we discuss the role of corporeality in its 
ontic movements, and wonder whether even the ‘material’ can provide an original ‘real’ ground from 
which a ‘necessary’ structure may be erected. It seems that there is a mediation already at play in the 
subjective representation of even the body, with its ontic ‘necessities.’  
53 (Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in the Non-Moral Sense, 147) 
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Lévi-Strauss’ connection of disparate myths fails to prove a structural certainty. The 
structure of mythological thought is twofold: 1) an adherence to the belief in an 
original sensuous event which is self-enclosed and necessary, and 2) open to 
abstractions which conform to the logic of the original model. The mythological 
frame precedes ontic experience as a metaphysical structure. It is at once the faith of 
the subject in the veracity of claims made with respect to an original event, and 
fidelity with abstractions allowed by the logic of the original model. Nietzsche states: 
As a creature of reason, human beings now make their actions subject 
to the rule of abstractions; they no longer tolerate being swept away by 
sudden impressions and sensuous perceptions; they now generalize all 
these impressions first, turning them into cooler, less colourful 
concepts in order to harness the vehicle of their lives and actions to 
them. Everything which distinguishes human being from animals 
depends on this ability to sublimate sensuous metaphors into a schema, 
in other words, to dissolve an image into a concept.54 
Mythological worldviews tend to posit complete truths—a set of master predicates that 
enclose the entirety of the world. An example from Jean-Luc Nancy: “The structure of 
all our mythology is the myth of abandonment…”55 This original myth finds its 
corresponding allegories not just in the Christian story of the fall of man contained in 
the Book of Genesis, but also across other onto-theological systems and within 
philosophy itself. Noting Lévi-Strauss, might we argue that the structure of the myth 
of the abandonment of man (from Being) adopts the quality of an existential 
universal? “The selfsame of the affective soul is the sleeping same that confounds 
itself—because it has never distinguished itself, never having been—with the totality of 
the other that affects it.”56 It might be the case that myths and metaphors stand in for 
 
54 Ibid., 146. 
55 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence, trans. Brian Holmes (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press,1994), 42. 
56 Ibid., 18. 
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an original representation of a structurally necessary event expressed by the world. 
The world as we provisionally defined is the field within which human subjective 
experience persists. As such, events contained ‘within the world’ might persist as 
ontologically significant entities. However, this logic remains in the conception of the 
world presupposed as a necessary totality, and not, as we will argue for in Chapter 
Two, as a chaotic background to which the subject applies an artificial unity.  
     Given the problems at the origin of the proper name and of a concrete center to 
any conception of the world, one wonders if any metaphysical system can get us closer 
to an adequate picture of the world. As Nietzsche notes: 
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which have 
been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and 
decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, 
strike a people as firmly established, canonical, and binding; truths are 
illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors 
which have become worn by frequent use and have lost all sensuous 
vigour, coins which, having lost their stamp, are now regarded as metal 
and no longer as coins.57 
Chapter Two will explore the constitution of the world as meaning-giving (expressive) 
in a different way. The ‘mythological apparatus’, absent a necessary totalized world, 
adopts a different logic, one in which the subject finds the world only through being-in 
the world. It is ontic experience, the surface, from which a picture of the world must 
be developed. Myth, according to Lévi-Strauss, “gives man, very importantly, the 
illusion that he can understand the universe and that he does understand the 
universe.” In our view, mythological thought has been ill-conceived as illusion. 
Chapter Two will re-situate myth to within ontic experience, not as an ontologically 
 
57 (Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in the Non-Moral Sense, 146) 
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necessary entity, but as the closure of the point of confrontation inherited by the 
multiplicity of sensuous contact with the world in its conception as chaos.  
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Chapter Two: The Mythological I  
2.1 The Aleatory Circle in its Ontic-Ontological Character 
Myth, with its always circular structure, is indeed the story of a 
foundation. It permits the construction of a model according to which 
the different pretenders can be judged. What needs a foundation, in 
fact, is always a pretension or a claim. It is the pretender who appeals to 
a foundation, whose claim may be judged well-founded, ill-founded, or 
unfounded.58 
The world is a series of phenomenal conditions within which the ‘subject’ finds itself. 
Whatever the nature of the composition of the real, the only persistent determinate 
ontic modality is the omnipresence of the subject in itself.59 Sensuous contact, 
phenomenal flows, reflection and mediation, among others, mark the equiprimordial 
conditions within which the subject is located within time and space. Regardless of the 
constitutive nature of the subject, the net sum of phenomenal sensation, sensuous 
contact, etc. does not indicate a concrete totality fragmented into partial 
representations encountered by the ‘subject’, but instead composes a synthetic 
construction comprised of contradicting, paradoxical, or nonsensical real or material 
 
58 (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 255) 
59 This notion is made explicit by Heidegger throughout Being and Time. I draw here from the sections 
(Division One) entitled “The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being” and “The Ontic Priority of 
the Question of Being.” Heidegger provisionally defines ontology as the question of the “Being of 
beings.” Heidegger writes, “To be ontological does not yet mean to develop an ontology. Thus if we 
reserve the term ontology for the explicit, theoretical question of the being of beings, the ontological 
character of Dasein referred to here is designated as pre-ontological.” We use ontic to distinguish 
between the Being of beings and that which persists as ‘actual’ or real’. In Being and Time Heidegger’s 
strategy is to trace the ontic to the ontological (existential) through an analysis of the ‘existentiell’ 
(ontic): “…the roots of the existential analysis, for their part, are ultimately existentiell; i.e. they are 
ontic. Only when philosophical research and inquiry themselves are grasped in an existentiell way—as a 
possibility of being of each existing Dasein—does it become possible at all to disclose the existentiality of 
existence and therewith to get hold of a sufficiently grounded set of ontological problems.” We adopt 
Heidegger’s notion of the position of the subject as the ultimate arbiter of meaning and of Being as such, 
but reject his ‘tool analysis’ as fundamentally based on a notion of objects that is incommensurate with 
philosophies of difference as developed below. Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: 
SUNY Press, 2010), 8-13.   
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flows which the subject brings to bear on the ‘world’ through a given epistemological 
framework. We have thus far compared two opposing conceptions of world, and given 
a brief explication of the role of myth within the concept of world as a totalized, 
knowable and necessary entity. The second chapter of the present work will explore 
the ‘myth apparatus’ within the dynamic of ontological chaos, offering a different take 
on the conditions of possibility which give rise to ‘mythological’ thought in the first 
instance. We do not take aim at a priori subjective structures nor the role of mediation 
and reflection, but rather examine myth-making from the starting point of ontic 
multiplicity and the event. It is within this dynamic, we will argue, that the conditions 
for ontological ‘knowledge’ become possible. 
     In classical thought, mediation marks the position of the philosophical decision, 
the point of ‘free will’.  The philosophical decision is the spatio-temporal modality of 
the subject as it completes and contains a type of sensuous or empirical event. The 
event indicates the point of genesis that presupposes the world as either a complete 
but partially inaccessible totality, or as a fragmented, chaotic flux. On the former view, 
a determinate, necessary world precedes the subject ahead of mediation or 
philosophical decision. The world, in this sense, persists as an objective real or 
material thing awaiting discovery and classification. On the latter view, the world is 
understood as a synthetic unity grafted on to the chaotic flows of a contingent 
universe.60  
     To understand the world as a series of chaotic ‘events,’ underwritten by material or 
real forces which gives rise to an ideational unity is to glimpse the world of pure ontic 
contingency. Chaos engenders multiplicity—the opening of ontic experience to the 
totality of possible outcomes contained within the event. The aleatory point marks the 
position of the chaotic multiple in its absolute ideational form. When one imagines 
throwing the dice, for example, the aleatory point names the position of the 
 
60 Cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (Columbia: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), 15-60. 
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multiplicity of every possible outcome, governed in turn by ontic rules. As Deleuze 
defines it: “An aleatory point is displaced through all the points on the dice, as though 
one time for all times.”61 In the case of the dice throw, a set of presupposed rules 
govern the conditions of possibility for every outcome contained within the precursor 
to the throw. The aleatory point names that point that includes the distributive 
possibility of every dice throw, every car speed, every lottery pick, etc. As Deleuze 
characterizes it: 
The games with which we are acquainted respond to a certain number 
of principles, which may take the object of a theory. This theory applies 
equally to games of skill and to games of chance; only the nature of the 
rules differs. 1)It is necessary that in every case a set of rules preexists 
the playing of the game, and, when one plays, this set takes on a 
categorical value; 2)these rules determine hypotheses which divide and 
apportion chance, that is, hypotheses of loss or gain (what happens 
if…); 3)These hypotheses organize the playing of the game according to 
a plurality of throws, which are really and numerically distinct. Each of 
them brings about a fixed distribution corresponding to one case or 
another. 4)the consequences of the throws range over the alternative 
“victory or defeat.” The characteristics of normal games are therefore 
the preexisting categorical rules, the distributing hypotheses, the fixed 
and numerical distinct distributions, and the ensuing results.62  
The aleatory point is fundamentally ontic—it exists within a set of preconditions that 
govern the rules of the game. It is also, however, ideational: the conditions of 
possibility for the multitude of outcomes contained within the aleatory point persist 
only insofar as the game play remains suspended with respect to time and space. The 
 
61 (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 283) 
62 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1990), 58-59. 
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moment the dice is thrown marks the moment of foreclosure of the aleatory point, 
along with the conditions of possibility contained in the multiplicity. We refer to this 
movement of the aleatory moment through to the point of ‘philosophical decision’ as 
the aleatory circle.63  
     The event names the point of sensuous contact between subject and world, the 
aleatory moment names the multiplicity of ontic possibility created by the event, and 
the aleatory circle names the dissolution of the possible through philosophical 
decision—an ontic necessity which simultaneously ‘completes’ the event, dissolving 
the multitude of possibilities contained within the aleatory moment. This ontic 
completion closes the aleatory circle by way of the free play of the decision-process of 
the subject, which serve to demonstrate the radically contingent character of the 
‘outcome’ of the aleatory circle.64  
 
63 I refer here to the ‘philosophical decision’ with an understanding that chance dictates the conditions 
of the outcome of the aleatory moment. I use philosophical decision to indicate the point of free will of 
the subject: the point of (moral) intervention which (necessarily) forecloses on the aleatory circle and 
the multitude contained within. I use philosophical decision because the ideational quality of 
representation (say, for example, in a number on a dice throw) is indicative of ontic contingency. I 
distinguish my concept of the philosophical decision from François Laruelle, who defines it as “…an 
operation of transcendence that believes (in a naïve and hallucinatory way) in the possibility of unitary 
discourse of the Real.” “Philosophical decision as structure involves the coupling, then the Unity, of 
contraries, and its function is to hallucinate the One-real and to foreclose it in this way. To philosophize 
is to decide on the Real and on thought, which ensues from it, ie., to believe to be able to align them with 
the universal order of the principle of sufficient philosophy.” François Laruelle, Dictionary of 
NonPhilosophy, trans. Taylor Adkins (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2013), 117. 
64 Here I distinguish the neologism ‘aleatory circle’ from Heidegger’s hermeneutic understanding of 
knowledge. With respect to scientific inquiry he states, “Fundamental concepts are determinations in 
which the area of knowledge underlying all the thematic objects of a science attains an understanding 
that precedes and guides all positive investigation. Accordingly these concepts first receive their genuine 
evidence and “grounding” only in a correspondingly preliminary research into the area of knowledge 
itself. But since each of these areas arises from the domain of beings themselves, this preliminary 
research that creates the fundamental concepts amounts to nothing else than interpreting these beings 
in terms of the basic constitution of their being.” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 9) The aleatory circle is 
characterized by the ontic multiplicity, or governing rules which give definition to a finite set of possible 
outcomes. It is not a fundamental positive postulate (ground) from which a determinate outcome may 
proceed. The aleatory circle is a structure of another kind: grounded only in sensuous empirical contact 
with ontic multiplicity. It the position of truncated ontological possibility and its ultimate necessary ontic 
foreclosure—a meeting point of time, space, and the body within the conditions of ontic possibility. 
Heidegger’s concept of the hermeneutic circle does mirror aspects of the aleatory circle as a ‘necessary 
fore-structure’: “The circle of understanding is not a circle in which any random kind of knowledge 
operates, but it is rather the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself.” (Being and 
Time, 148). Though I agree with Heidegger in the ‘necessity’ of the circle as an essential fore-structure of 
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     The subject names the concept of the locus of the experience of time and space. The 
conjugation of time and space refers to an ontically contingent movement of relative 
indeterminacy. The subject encounters the world in its chaotic complexity, not as a 
structured totality, but rather as a movement of forces that operate in a quasi-
determinate mode. This mode is characterized by the interplay of time, space, and 
corporeality. Corporeality determines a set of ontic principles that play out necessarily 
in time and space. Bodies require particularities relative to biological determinations: 
sustenance, rest, movement, excitation, etc. These attributes, taken as given or 
‘natural’, rely on the capacity of the corporeal subject to enact its will in the world in 
order for the ‘subject’ to persist in time and space. For our purposes, ‘will’ names a 
metonymy which designates the relationship of the subject to the flow of ‘natural’ 
forces which give rise to the ‘effects’ of subjectivity as such.65  
     The event marks the opening of an ontic decision-process that is ‘determined’ by 
the modalities of corporeality. The corporeal body is demonstrative of a set of 
becoming properties inherent to biological existence as experienced in its ontic mode. 
Time and space govern possible experience of the body, but do not fully determine the 
reflective quality of mediation. There is no analytic governance with respect to the 
interaction between body, ‘mind’, and time and space. As such, when one encounters 
‘the world’, we suppose that a multiplicity of possible corporeal determinations is 
opened along with the ontological conditions for all possibility. As Deleuze 
characterizes it: 
 
the subject, I disagree that it contains an essential ontological quality. The aleatory circle relies on the 
contingency of the encounter, and not on any essential, necessary or universal characteristics of the 
subject which give definition to empirical contact. The ‘necessity’ of the fore-structure is, in all 
probability, a corporeal difference which we observe in non-human animals and the sensory apparatus 
of plants or other ‘non-sentient’ beings. The key difference for the human subject lies in the mediation 
between empirical contact and the interpretation of events. See Chapter Three for a discussion on the 
role of representation and reflection.  
65 I set aside, for the moment, the complex relationship between the subject, the corporeal body, natural 
forces or flows, and desire as such, instead focusing on the mediation of subject, body, and the 
multiplicity of the aleatory certain which traverses the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’. 
 37 
We have seen that past, present, and future were not all three parts of a 
single temporality, but that they rather formed two readings of time, 
each one which is complete and excludes the other: on the one hand, 
the always limited present, which measures the action of bodies as 
causes and the state of their mixtures in depth (Chronos); on the other, 
the essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal 
events, at the surface, as effects (Aion).66 
The ontologically infinite event contained within the finite state of affairs is 
presupposed as an a priori condition of experience—of the event of the bodily 
encounter itself.  In its sensuous mode, the corporeal body acts as the locus within 
which ontic time proceeds. This contact also includes the ontological conditions of all 
possibility with respect to time—the position of pure potentiality thought as an 
imaginative real. Deleuze understands the surface as the point of convergence of the 
infinite, the gathering point of ontic, linear time with time immemorial. The 
governance of the faculty of the imagination births the concept of the world as infinite 
time by suturing partial ontic determinations into a cohesive ‘whole.’ Hence, a 
mythological epistemological apparatus precedes the subject in a repetitive mode. The 
ontic quality of the linear nature of time as experienced by the body adapts the subject 
to the worldly state of chaos through the constitution of a synthetic mythological 
apparatus—a constitutive and constituted ‘structure’ that correlates to sensuous 
experience, but lacks original ground in a self-same property. 
     The repetition constituting the myth apparatus emerges through the interplay of 
partially determinate concepts—it is a synthetic proposition that grafts the ‘objects’ of 
linear sensuous experience—the outcome of the aleatory circle and the foreclosure of 
the event—on to the world as a perceived, necessary totality.  In a sense, the myth 
structure both precedes and proceeds the subject, simultaneously absorbing and 
dissolving empirical difference in a linear procession in time, while also reinforcing 
 
66 (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 61) 
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the repetitive structural constitution of the apparatus itself. In the absence of the 
proper name, of the original model or self-same thing, the subject, in its corporeal 
existence, subjugates ontic difference to the false principal of the repetition of essence. 
As such, the mythological apparatus contains the multiple only insofar as it can be 
brought to heel under an epistemological frame of reference. The presupposition of 
self-same objects subordinates difference to repetitive ontic rules, dissolving the 
multiple while constituting the governing structure of the myth apparatus. What 
emerges is the world of what Deleuze would call common sense, of short-hand ontic 
rules that simultaneously forecloses both the ontic multiple and the ontological 
conditions of all possibility. 
Not only does thought appropriate the ideal of an ‘orthodoxy’, not only 
does common sense find its object in the categories of opposition, 
similitude, analogy and identity, but error itself implies this 
transcendence of a common sense with regard to sensations, and of a 
soul with regard to all the faculties whose collaboration [syllogismos] in 
relation to the form of the Same it determines.67 
At the outset, the aleatory point is a point of the multiple—of the disruption and 
displacement of ontic repetition, of the erasure of the apparatus in advance of its re-
suturing upon the closing of the aleatory circle in a moral or philosophical decision. 
We refer to the concept of moral or philosophical decision to mark the foreclosure on 
both the ontological preconditions for the aleatory moment, as well as a closing off of 
the multiplicity of possible ontic outcomes—the erasure of the aleatory moment and 
the closing of the possibility for free play by the subject. 
     As a rule, the mythological apparatus constitutes the subject in two modes: 1) as the 
arbiter of clarification and ‘meaning’ with respect to ontic repetition, and 2) as the 
guarantor of safety for the subject against the onslaught of ontological chaos. The 
 
67 (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 148) 
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agnostic mode of thought modifies the mythological apparatus, creating a set of 
preconditions lacking determination as a baseline for general understanding. In its 
theistic mode, the philosophical decision adopts the quality of synthetic deduction: 
ontic properties of empirical events are sutured to create an a posteriori construction. 
We refer to these dogmatisms as aesthetic in nature. What Kant refers to as the 
synthetic application of partially determinate concepts68 (those which lack an analytic 
deduction, grounded in nature), we position as the synthetic collaboration of a linear 
series of philosophical decisions made in the ontic mode. The ‘repetition’ of the 
foreclosure of the aleatory circle, the abandonment of the multiple in favor of a 
repetition of the ‘same’, constitutes the myth apparatus with positive, collaborative 
and correlated ‘reasons’ for belief. In short, the event, which is characterized by the 
sensuous, bodily encounter of the subject with the ‘world’, is the foundation for the 
construction of the theistic mythological apparatus. This logic depends on the 
foreclosure of the conditions of all possibility in favor of an aesthetic determination of 
positive value. In this sense, the concept of God persists as an ontic construction 
grounded not in the ontological opening of all possibility, but rather in the repetition 
of the conditions of the philosophical or moral decision. Sense-phenomena that lack 
determinacy are characterized by an ontic multiplicity which, when (necessarily) 
closed, forms the basis for an apparatus comprised of partially determinate concepts. 
The ground of this type of aesthetic Idea is, as Kant rightly described, indeterminate: 
In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, 
associated with a given concept, which is combined with such a 
manifold of partial representations in the free use of the imagination 
that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for 
it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is 
 
68 See Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, section 5:316, p.194. 
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unnameable, the feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and 
combines spirit with the mere letter of language.69  
Losing one’s faith describes the return to the free play of the moral or philosophical 
decision with respect to its ground—the de-ranging or de-suturing that opens the 
stitches binding ontic repetition. It is only through affirmation that the closure of the 
aleatory circle occurs, constructing the basis for the myth apparatus. In the absence of 
affirmation, the subject confronts the nature of chaos in all its radical contingency.  
     This lack demonstrates the ideational quality of affirmation with respect to 
corporeality in its ontic mode. Deleuze characterizes the ideational quality of 
affirmation as follows: 
Each thought emits a distribution of singularities. All of these thoughts 
communicate in one long thought, causing all the forms or figures of 
the nomadic distribution to correspond to its own displacement, 
everywhere insinuating chance and ramifying each thought, linking the 
“once and for all” to “each time” for the sake of “all time.” For only 
thought finds it possible to affirm all chance and to make chance into an 
object of affirmation. If one tries to play this game other than in 
thought, nothing happens; and if one tries to produce a result other 
than the work of art, nothing is produced. This game, which can only 
exist in thought and which has no other result other than the work of 
art, is also that by which thought and art are real and disturbing reality, 
morality, and the economy of the world.70 
Value denotes the preferred corporeal consequence of the philosophical decision, 
which serves to banish the multiplicity of the aleatory moment through affirmation. 
 
69 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 194. 
70 (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 60) 
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The subject self-affirms, bringing coherence and unity where only chaos persists. In its 
repetitive mode, the myth apparatus provides the rationale for the moral or 
philosophical decision, based on the supposition of a totalized, necessary world within 
which the essence of objects eternally returns.71  
     It is here that the concept of humour exposes the fundamental contingency 
characterizing value judgment as such. Humour serves to dissolve the ‘necessary’ link 
between ontic multiplicity and the affirmation of the philosophical or moral decision. 
It operates as the reversal of the philosophical decision and the re-opening of the 
aleatory in imaginative form. Ironic satire, pastiche, impressions rend the stitches of 
ontic repetition and glimpse the aleatory moment and its ontological conditions of 
possibility. As Deleuze notes: 
Humour is the art of the surfaces and of the doubles of Nomad 
singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point; it is the art of 
static genesis, savoire-faire of the pure event and the “fourth person 
singular”—with every signification, denotation, and manifestation 
suspended, all height and depth abolished.72 
Affirmation contains the conditions for the dissolution of the aleatory moment. 
Affirmation relies on the supposition of a governing world within which repetition is 
representative of causal determinacy.73 Humour intervenes on behalf of chaos and 
 
71 In his early work on Nietzsche, Deleuze notes of value: “Truth is never related to what it presupposes. 
But there is not truth that, before being a truth, is not the bringing into effect of a sense or the 
realization of a value. Truth, as a concept, is entirely undetermined. Everything depends on the value 
and sense of what we think. We always have the truths we deserve as a function of the sense of what we 
conceive, of the value of what we believe. See (Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 104).  
72 (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 141) 
73 Here I conceive of affirmation in a manner which departs from Deleuze. For Deleuze, affirmation 
adopts a joyous quality, affirming difference, disparity, and decentering over the subordination of 
difference to the identity of concepts and the return of the Same. See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 
288. In my conception, affirmation marks the closure of the multiple and the constitution of the myth 
apparatus. Deleuze also characterizes affirmation with respect to the “univocity of Being: “The univocity 
of Being merges with the positive use of the disjunctive synthesis which is the highest affirmation. It is 
the eternal return itself, or—as we have seen in the case of the ideal game—the affirmation of all chance 
in a single moment, the unique cast for all throws, one Being and only for all forms and all times, a 
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serves as a reminder of ontic multiplicity and the contingency of the subject-position 
relative to the event in its temporal phases. The corporeal body, which is supposed to 
ground necessary ontological conditions, is exposed as a contingent phenomenon 
whose modalities mirror that of randomness. The myth apparatus covers over this 
dynamic by stitching indeterminate ontic concepts together by way of repetition of 
the philosophical or moral decision, which are themselves a function of a rationality 
based on value judgments founded in the ‘best practices’ of the corporeal body. In this 
sense, myths precede the ontic, but not the ontological. The ontological—the 
background noise which gives rise to the modalities of the ontic, is effaced in favor of a 
structure whose supposed determinacy lies in the ‘necessary’ conditions of the 
corporeal body.  
2.2 Chance, or the Condition of the Aleatory 
“Nothing is exempt from the game,” writes Deleuze, “consequences are not subtracted 
from chance by connecting them with a hypothetical necessity which would tie them 
to a determinate fragment; on the contrary, they are adequate to the whole of chance, 
which retains and subdivides all possible consequences.”74 The philosophical decision 
is the closure of the opening of all possibility and the return to the ontic mode. The 
whole of chance names the condition of all possibility absent its corporeal conditions.  
 
single instance for all that exists, a single phantom for all the living, a single voice for every hum of 
voices and every drop of water in the sea.” (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 179-180). We depart here from 
Deleuze in his logic of the surface and his positioning of the primacy of the ontic, of factual existence, 
and the ontological, the Being of beings as a concrete totality. For Deleuze in The Logic of Sense, only 
non-sense persists relative to the surface, which forecloses on the possibility of ontological knowledge. In 
his scheme, the event, as an ideal entity, cannot yield ontological knowledge due to its ideal nature. 
Deleuze encloses the surface as follows: “Univocal Being inheres in language and happens to things; it 
measures the internal relation of Being. It is extra-Being, that is, the minimum of Being common to the 
real, the possible, and the impossible. A position in the void of all events in one, an expression in the 
nonsense of all senses in one, univocal Being is the pure form of Aion, the form of exteriority which 
relates things and propositions. In short, the univocity of Being has three determinations: one single 
event for all events; one and the same aliquid for that which happens and that which is said; and one 
and the same Being for the impossible, the possible, and the real.” (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 180) 
74 (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 283) 
 43 
     When choosing option A over option B, the subject closes the circle within which 
all possible decisions are contained. In this way, the constraints of time and space, 
which act either on or within the subject, become real, dividing the infinite into the 
finite and generating a series grounded in the repetition of the philosophical or moral 
decision. The totality of the game contains not only the infinite possibility of its 
ontological genesis, it also includes each possible completion of the ontic 
philosophical or moral decision as part of its ‘structure’. This structure is one of ontic 
commitment—of the quasi-necessity of the subject as a corporeal entity persisting in 
time and space. The affirmation or philosophical decision that relinquishes the 
aleatory point from its privileged ontological position forecloses on the multiplicity of 
seen and unseen possibility. Affirmation marks the point of enclosure that completes 
the ontological-to-ontic movement from all possibility to one of corporeal 
contingency. This aleatory circle is the primordial mode of the subject-position 
thrown into ontic necessity. If the world is characterized by chaotic flows within 
which a synthetic unified subject persists, then the aleatory circle marks a point of 
ontological-ontic confrontation that serves to express the absolute contingency of the 
subject-position. On the other hand, if the world were a structured and necessary 
totality, partially graspable by the subject, the aleatory circle would instead mark the 
place of the encounter or contact with partial determinate fragments of the world in 
its ontological necessity. This split determines two modes of mythological thought. 
     In the first mode, the encounter with a totalized structural and necessarily whole 
world positions the subject within a strict truth / falsity dichotomy. In this 
formulation, mythology denotes the position of the false—that which lacks 
correspondence with the necessary world in its totality. Myths become abstractions or 
fantasies lacking reference to empirical phenomena whose ground persist within the 
totalized world. The history of Western thought has privileged this epistemological 
mode, preferring a moral admonition that elevates the primacy of the self-same model 
above the groundless copy. This conceptual apparatus is the original framework that 
assumes the world in its concrete totality. In his review of Plato, Deleuze notes: 
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The whole of Platonism, by contrast, is dominated by the idea of 
drawing a distinction between 'the thing itself' and the simulacra. 
Difference is not thought in itself but related to a ground, subordinated 
to the same and subject to mediation in mythic form. Overturning 
Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of 
model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.75  
In the second mode of mythological thought, the subject of ideational unity, bringing 
synthetic, aesthetic, or moral cohesion to a non-totalized or radically contingent 
nominalist world, forms a mythological apparatus which is itself constitutive of the 
subject as such. Using a series of ‘short-hand’—metonymies, allegories, religious 
symbolism, etc.—the myth apparatus provides an epistemological framework within 
which ideational repetition proceeds. On the latter view, mythology adopts the quality 
of a groundless structure, applying the rules of synthetic deduction in the construction 
of the mythological apparatus. The aleatory circle, on this view, conceptualizes the 
conditions for the encounter of a non-totalizeable ontological chaos with its ontic 
counterpart: the corporeal. The mythological apparatus is the series of repetitive 
philosophical decisions—moral, synthetic unities of consistent enclosures constituting 
the unity of the subject. Myth is the grafting of this apparatus on to the ‘event’ of the 
aleatory circle in its ontic mode ahead of the event’s meaningful interpretation played 
out in time. 
     In a totalized, necessary world, the mythological apparatus loses its consistency. 
Error or falsity mark the master concepts for objects either included in an ontic 
schema or banished to the realm of fantasy or illusion. Within this logic, ‘mythologies’ 
become the post-facto position of the subject of the unreal—of that which lacks 
correspondence to the totality of the world as given in ontic experience.  
 
75 Ibid., 66, my emphasis. 
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     In its empirical mode, mythologies that persist independent of the necessary world 
adopt the quality of non-sense—no correlate presents to ground or determine a 
mythological concept, and no persistent ‘rule’ to govern their necessity. Within the 
fractured world of chaos, mythology necessarily precedes the subject. The synthetic 
unity grafted on to indeterminate ontological conditions by the subject opens up a 
field of sense within which events are interpreted. As Kant interprets this as follows: 
The aesthetic idea (archetype, prototype) is for both grounded in the 
imagination; the shape, however, which constitutes its expression 
(ectype, afterimage) is given either in its corporeal extension (as the 
object itself exists) or in accordance with the way in which the latter is 
depicted in the eye (in accordance with its appearance on a plane); or 
else, whatever the former is, either the relation to a real end or just the 
appearance of one is made into a condition for reflection.76  
The aleatory circle demonstrates both the transcendental ontological conditions for 
the possibility of the infinite, while simultaneously foreclosing on this possibility in 
the movement of the ontically-necessary philosophical or moral decision. The aleatory 
circle contains both the creation and the destruction of the ontological through its 
‘opening’ of the ontological conditions which precede the multiplicity of the aleatory 
point and the ‘closing’ of these conditions necessarily in time. There can be no 
suspension of the aleatory circle outside of a pure ideation that considers the 
multiplicity of the aleatory point as its own, real-existing object. It is an object that is 
only ever an instance of the possibility of a repetition of a different type, of the free 
play of the subject within a set of given parameters prescribed in advance. It is, 
however, a contingent object grounded only in the meeting point of the corporeal, 
time, and space.  
 
76 (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 199) 
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     In order to ground a concept of a totalized world, the subject relies on the 
supposition of the existential necessity of the ontic experience of time and space. 
Rather, corporeality, in its finite and fractured determinations, demonstrates both the 
conditions of the ontologically all possible and the ontically impossible. Far from 
determining the world as a structural necessity, the aleatory circle posits a multiplicity 
that is contained within the radical finitude of ontic contingency. Myth enters as the 
constitution of a ‘world’ within a series of 'repeating’, yet contingent phenomena—
based specifically on corporeal conditions. Hence, when Heidegger seeks to ground 
the concept of Being within a temporal structure, he relies on a classical view of the 
world as a necessary totality within which the subject discovers ontological necessity 
(‘Being-there’).77 As we have noted, however, the aleatory circle radicalizes ontic 
contingency and demonstrates the reliance of the structure of time as one of corporeal 
determination, itself a constituent part of the mythological apparatus. As such, the 
conceptualization of time as ontologically necessary and determinate of ontic 
contingency reveals itself as a subjective presupposition of the world as a concrete 
totality. In the absence of this totality, the concept of time re-inhabits its place as one 
other in a countless chain of indeterminate ontic phenomena whose only ground 
appears in corporeal experience. As Deleuze characterizes the experience of 
subjectivity in time:  
Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox 
of inner sense. The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a 
passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts 
it, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it 
like an Other within itself. To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the self 
- that is, the passive position (what Kant calls the receptivity of 
intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added 
the form of the determinable, namely time. Nor is 'add' entirely the 
 
77 See (Heidegger, “Dasein and Temporality,” in Being and Time, 221-226) 
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right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference 
and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the I were 
fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty 
form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which 
appears in time. Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a 
passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the 
fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element 
of the Copernican Revolution.78 
Deleuze’s fractured I is precisely the opening within which the confrontation of the 
ontological with the ontic plays out in the aleatory circle. Time reveals its own 
indeterminacy while simultaneously illuminating the conditions for its ontic 
possibility: the fractured I which presupposes time as ontologically given. Likewise, 
the world as a concrete totality demands the fidelity of time to its necessary structure. 
It is within time that the model of the world expresses its necessities. What is 
expressed, however, are not the representations of a knowable, fixed, totalized world, 
but instead a reality in which modally different expressions impress upon passive 
subjects in a sensuous mode. The locus of this confusion lies at the confrontation 
between the ontological and the ontic, demonstrated in the aleatory circle.  
     The mythological apparatus of serialized repetitive events presents an 
overdetermined epistemology—ontically necessary, repetitive, moral or philosophical 
decisions encase the fractured I within a fantasy framework, one which abolishes the 
multiplicity—the pure, ideational aleatory moment—in favor of a theory of varying 
consequences.  
     The phenomenon of Regret enters as an attuned sensuous remainder indicating 
that the philosophical decision can never re-fold itself back into the multiplicity of the 
aleatory point. The superposition of the aleatory marks an atemporal ontic necessity—
 
78 (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, my emphasis, 86) 
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it is always determined by circumstance of a corporeal character. However, regret also 
informs the subject of the transcendental conditions of all possibility. In the moment 
of dissolution of the multiplicity (necessarily), the subject glimpses the transcendental 
conditions for the possibility of the ontologically all possible. It is because we make the 
aleatory circle an object of relevant inquiry that we are able to understand that which 
might be otherwise. Because difference is the first priority of the world, the subject 
stretches out its cognition in advance, anticipating possible difference before it 
becomes ‘real.’ This dynamic often results in transcendental error, but also allows the 
construction of alternative ontological conceptions of the world, and inaugurates the 
question of existence in the first instance.  
     Despite the enclosure of the ontologically infinite within the ontically necessary, 
the aleatory circle which includes both the “problem” and its possible “solution” is 
never a self-enclosed totality, containing both the aleatory point which characterizes 
the philosophical decision, and the affirmation or completion. Completion marks a 
temporal moral imposition of a subject of unique experience, and generally adopts the 
form of “I chose to do this because…” This because marks the conjugation of 
experience with a synthetic proposition. Despite the ontological opening created by 
the aleatory circle, which allows the subject to glimpse the conditions of all possibility, 
the ontic necessity of time determines the constitution of the mythological subject in 
advance of the event. The because of the philosophical decision relies on a predicate 
which contains both the repetition of the mythological apparatus, itself constituted by 
empirical precedence, and the ontological glimpse of all possibility contained in every 
sensuous encounter. Deleuze notes: 
In depth, it is through infinite identity that contraries communicate 
and that the identity of each finds itself broken and divided. This makes 
each term at once the moment and the whole; the part, the relation, and 
the whole; the self, the world, and God; the subject, the copula, and the 
predicate. But the situation is altogether different at the surface where 
only infinitive events are deployed; each one communicates with the 
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other through the positive characters of its distance and by the 
affirmative character of the disjunction.79 
The locus of ontological difference is the interplay of the ontological with the ontic 
contained within the circle of the aleatory point and the philosophical decision. The 
indeterminacy of the ontological all possible is inscribed within the closure of the 
aleatory circle. In its philosophical ‘decision-making,’ the mythological apparatus 
preceding every sensuous encounter is further constituted as a repetitive motif. As 
such, the ontological all possible is diminished in favor of what is ‘real.’  Hence, the 
constitution of the subject relies on repetition of a presupposed same (the decision) as 
a type of ‘world building’. The world, in this sense, is not constituting, but rather 
constitutive of (the subject).   
     Mythology, misunderstood as a lack of correlation to that which is real, is confused 
within the dynamic of the interplay between the ontological and the ontic discovered 
in the aleatory circle. On this view, phenomena that fail to correspond to the 
repetitions of the dominant mythological apparatus are considered fantastical or 
otherwise. The weakness of the scientific worldview is a reliance on the supposition of 
the ontic as necessary—correlated to a totalized and knowable world in which the 
subject persists. Reductionism is the concept for those methods privileging the givens 
of ontic experience over the dynamic of the aleatory circle in its exposure of the all 
possible. If affirmation were to contain an analytic judgment, it would be expressed 
within a self-enclosed epistemic certainty. The necessity of the question—the 
superposition of the aleatory point—consists in a prior determination given in 
experience. As Deleuze notes: 
Whereas Analytics gives us the means to solve a problem already given, 
or to respond to a question, Dialectics shows how to pose a question 
legitimately. Analytics studies the process by which the syllogism 
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necessarily leads to a conclusion, while Dialectics invents the subjects 
of syllogisms (precisely what Aristotle calls ‘problems’) and engenders 
the elements of syllogisms concerning a given subject (‘propositions’).80 
A closed totality would demonstrate epistemic certainty of a particular kind, one 
which constitutes the subject based on the richness of corporeal experience only, 
rather than what we observe: a constitution of the self based on the conjugation of 
experience with synthetic proposition. When the subject faces the philosophical 
decision, it cannot be experience alone that dictates affirmation. In the case of brute 
experience, a teleological analytic science could easily replace philosophical ethics as 
the primary mode of inquiry into the philosophical decision. If indeed experience 
marks the suture of the world in its expressive mode with the sense-proposition of a 
subject persisting in time and space, we would encounter a multitude of pure analytic 
determinations. Properties of the world, given in its positive form, rather than present 
as paradoxical or aporetic, would express a formal grouping of phenomena given to 
their natural essence. In his work on sense Deleuze notes: “Paradox is opposed to 
doxa, namely, good sense and common sense. Now, good sense is said of one direction 
only: it is the unique sense and expresses the demand of an order according to which it 
is necessary to choose one direction and to hold onto it.”81 In our language, paradox 
represents the incommensurability of variable ontic philosophical or moral decisions 
played out in time and space and serialized within the subject. This logic relies on the 
necessary closure of the aleatory moment, which contains its own form of paradox: 
that of the impossibility of the containment of the multiplicity outside an ideational 
arrangement. The ‘necessities’ which constitute the myth apparatus are fundamental 
doxa—the formation of a grouping of reductions which serve to eliminate the 
possibility of the otherwise. “It could not have been otherwise” is the cultural motif 
enamored with the mythological apparatus and the good sense from which it derives its 
 
80 (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 160) 
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rationale. Paradox always threatens the fictitious ground of good sense and of doxa, 
marking the return of the multiple and of the otherwise. Two or more incommensurate 
ontic philosophical or moral decisions may only co-exist in a subjective apparatus that 
embraces the moment of the multiple and of pure, ideational ontic possibility 
engendered by the aleatory.  
     Experience denotes a sensuous measure of partial or indeterminate contingent 
objects, consistently at odds with one another. As opposed to an analytic mode of 
perception, the subject draws on its wealth of experience of partial and paradoxical 
elements to inform a philosophical decision, subsuming this experience within a 
synthetic proposition. This conjunction of experience with what Kant referred to as 
transcendental structures marks the philosophical decision as a fundamentally 
affirmative mode. The aleatory point, which contains the multiplicity of possible 
outcomes, is thus modified in two ways: 1) under the diktats of a historico-subjective 
experience that is governed exclusively by sensuous modes of time and space, and 2) 
within an ideal synthetic proposition—an iterative, non-causal, positive imposition 
grafted on to the world of experience as a means toward closing the perennial 
openness of the aleatory point. This moment of synthetic proposition marks the locus 
for the inquiry into the modalities that characterize mythological thought. As a quasi-
determinate empirical mode, the event of the affirmation of the aleatory point away 
from its openness and toward its foreclosure in synthetic proposition is none other 
than the application of the generation and repetition of the mythological apparatus 
governing the subject in time and space. Consider Schelling:  
Determinism counters this system of equilibrium of free will and, 
indeed, with complete justification, since it claims the empirical 
necessity of all actions because each is determined by representations 
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or other causes that lie in the past and that no longer remain within our 
power during the action itself.82  
One regrets a decision when the opportunity for perceived beneficial experience has 
been decidedly closed. The abandonment of the aleatory point takes the form of the 
determined affirmation—a singular decision that serves to reduce the multiplicity of 
the aleatory to a mono-logical event. This mode of the event arrives, however, by way 
of an ontic temporal necessity: the openness of the aleatory point persists solely as an 
atemporal entity containing every possible outcome of decision. The philosophical 
decision marks the ontic temporal point within which the circle of the multiplicity of 
the aleatory point is closed with its necessary outcome. Though the outcome is 
differential—allowing for variation across the multiplicity of possible outcomes, the 
aleatory point-to-philosophical-decision apparatus is an ontic necessity—a closed 
circle within which the entire ‘structure’ of the temporal event is contained. This 
structure is seemingly determined in advance of the subject by time and space, 
appearing phenomenally as an ontic necessity, and grounding the event of 
philosophical decision within a transcendental apparatus. In this conception, the 
event precedes the subject as a real-existing entity of unknown determination. 
Something forces the subject to think. “This object is an object not of recognition,” 
writes Deleuze,  
What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be 
grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In 
whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. 
In this sense it is opposed to recognition. In recognition, the sensible is 
not at all that which can only be sensed, but that which bears directly 
 
82 (Schelling, Freedom Essay, 49) 
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upon the senses in an object which can be recalled, imagined or 
conceived.83  
It is often presupposed that this thing marks a determinate ground—material or 
otherwise—which coerces the ‘subject’ into action related to the event. As such, the 
basis for empirical analysis grounds itself within the structure of the relationship 
between that which forces the subject to consider, and the subject as a transcendental 
framework of perception which interprets the ground according to rules fixed in time 
and space.   
     Problems persist in time and space as a quasi-determined extension of corporeality, 
itself a product of a seemingly essential ontic necessity. The production of difference 
within corporeal existence relates to two specific ontic modes: time and space, each of 
which serves as a governing ‘cause’ of ‘effects’ experienced by the body. Thus, the 
body, as the locus of the aleatory point and the philosophical decision, enjoys a 
privileged status with respect to epistemological understanding. The perceived 
necessity of time and space marks a reduction of the differential modes of the subject 
to within the enclosure of the event as characterized by the aleatory circle. The body is 
the center of sensuous contact with the ‘world’—a field of contact within which time 
and space proceed. Space is the correlate concept of bodily movement—its excitations, 
enjoyment, pain etc. Time is the unique force adding relevance to the subjective 
encounter, acting as the moderator of meaning with respect to the sensuous 
encounter of body with space. These two ontic ‘necessities’ birth the modulations of 
the mythological apparatus and ground ontic experience. As such, the ‘world’ 
expresses itself only insofar as it may be interpreted within a dynamic framework 
enclosed within the confines of time and space. Analysis of the fluctuations which 
inhere in the relationship between time, space, and the body, we refer to as empirical 
inquiry.  
 
83 (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 139) 
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     The first postulate of the empirical mode of analysis is the abandonment of the 
variation of possible ontological difference in favor of a metaphysics of the event and 
its genesis. The aleatory circle emerges as the result of the event, which demands the 
subject to consider the world as a concrete, observable and experiential object, 
forgetting the non-ground of the aleatory moment which fixes the multiple in time 
and space. Within empirical metaphysics corporeal sensuous experience is 
presupposed as the underwriter of the phenomenon of the event. Within the 
multiplicity of possibility the beginning and end of ground is the body, through which 
the world expresses its essential properties. As such, corporeality enjoys a privileged 
position within the hierarchy of human understanding. Phenomena of possible 
concern are thus inscribed within a serialized mode: reference to the event and its 
outcome persist within a repetitive ideation that reduces the multiplicity of the 
aleatory to the mark of its preferred outcomes—specifically those with historical 
precedent. Deleuze is correct, therefore, in his definition of repetition as an original 
means of mediating difference in itself. As Deleuze notes: “Repetition is never a 
historical fact, but rather the historical condition under which something new is 
effectively produced.”84 And, as Deleuze notes,85 the moment of repetition is the 
moment of ideational foreclosure: when the philosophical decision is made, closing 
the aleatory circle, repetition emerges as the moral ‘lesson’, or in more refined 
terminology, as the creation of a fundamental mythology. As the closure of the 
aleatory moment with the philosophical decision an original ‘repetition’ finds its ontic 
genesis. As a serialization of linear historical moments, the generative function of the 
aleatory circle becomes clear: the philosophical or moral decision, itself an ontic 
necessity resulting from the closure of the multiplicity—itself encountered as 
temporal necessity through another ontic necessity: corporeality—constitutes a 
grouping of ideal moral lessons which themselves inform the mythological apparatus.  
 
84 Ibid., 90. 
85 Ibid., 76. 
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Deleuze writes: 
The role of the imagination, or the mind which contemplates in its 
multiple and fragmented states, is to draw something new from 
repetition, to draw difference from it. For that matter, repetition is 
itself in essence imaginary, since the imagination alone here forms the 
‘moment’ of the vis repetitiva from the point of view of constitution: it 
makes that which it contracts appear as elements or cases of 
repetition.86 
To grasp the concept of the aleatory enclosure is to glimpse the relative ‘universal’ 
simplicity of corporeal existence. The body, situated as an ontic necessity within time 
and space, functions as the ground over which phenomenal moments proceed. It is no 
coincidence, then, that the gambler archetype enjoys a particular position of scorn 
within bourgeois rationality. The gambler exposes the perceived necessary condition 
of the aleatory enclosure as one of corporeal contingency. At once satirizing the 
groundlessness of economic determinism, while simultaneously demonstrating the 
contingent character of corporeal determination, the gambler, in a single throw of the 
dice, forecloses on the possibility of ontic subjective superposition—with bodies like 
these and time like that, the gambler demonstrates the impossibility of maintaining 
the multiplicity of the aleatory moment and illuminates the conditions for the 
openness of ontological all possibility. Even in its limited sense, bound by 
determinations of time, space, bodies, and rules, the affirmation of the dice throw 
serves as metaphor for the ontic necessity of the philosophical decision. In its ontic 
mode, the affirmation marks the temporal completion of a circle which is comprised 
of the aleatory point and the multiplicity of possible outcomes. 
 
 
86 Ibid., 76. 
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2.3 The ‘I’ of the Corporeal 
Historical views from theology and philosophy posit an ontologically necessary I 
where only a contingent this persists. The cogito is a non-essential atemporal 
abstraction that stands for the mark of unity between ontic experience and its 
supposed ontological genesis. Phenomenally, the I encounters a range of differential 
empirical stimulus, providing a seemingly necessary, yet always relative mode of 
understanding attuned to the ontic world, itself divided into two human-centric 
essential properties: time and space. Corporeality stratifies existence into an 
existential doubling: overlapping and relational empirical ‘events’, ‘materially’-derived 
ontic necessities which persist relative to time and space, and the ontological 
suppositions endemic to empirical understanding of the ‘event’ as such, allegorized as 
the cogito. Despite the formation of a field of grounding ontic modalities, the body 
does not constitute a philosophical substance which captures a world of totality. As 
Gabriel argues: “If the self was a substance, our cognitive access to it would have to be 
the grasp of substance. Yet, our cognitive access to any substance is fallible insofar as 
it has to represent the substance in question.”87 The representation of the self as 
derived from the ontic modalities of the body relies on a logical synthesis of variable 
properties that provide an aesthetic veneer of corporeal totality. We neither observe a 
fractured I reaching out in to a cohesive total world, nor do we experience a fixed, 
determinate subject ‘thrown’ in to a chaotic world. Both conceptions are 
fundamentally based on mythological structures of thought of another variety: the 
supposition of substance with respect to the subject assumes an existent, yet 
unobservable ontological given where only ontic difference persists. Likewise, positing 
the world as a necessary totality confuses the essence of causation with the contingent 
nature of effect. As Deleuze notes: “For Kant as for Descartes, it is the identity of the 
Self in the ‘I think’ which grounds the harmony of all the faculties and their agreement 
on the form of a supposed same object.”88 The body has, in our era, become the stand-
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in for an elusive I—the ground which stretches along time as a supposed self-Same 
object within which the world becomes known. Corporeality produces sense, but that 
sense remains ideal. The body is the quasi-cause of incorporeal schemes that govern 
the subjective relation to the body as an object of representation. In the cataloguing of 
the various modalities of the body, the subject adopts various “best practices” (doxa) 
that reinforce the view of the body as an essential object to which positive affirmations 
may be applied.  
     In its specific mode of understanding, the corporeal I is the producer of sense with 
respect to its reference, understood traditionally as the world as it exists in itself. In an 
onto-theological framework, the I finds its strongest dualism: the world of the 
corporeal—of phenomena derived from sensuous encounters,’ and that of the 
spiritual or mystic—speculative flows of meaning operating independently of the 
confines of time and space. The concept of the infinite is the concept of an onto-
theological supposition of an I immemorial, preceding and proceeding the corporeal 
life of time and space. The aleatory circle demonstrates the nature of the corporeal 
encounter: strictly contingent, persistently bound by the confines of time and space, 
and mediated by a decision-mechanism of unknown origin. The reference of sense is 
always that which forces the philosophical decision: the multiple and the different. It 
seems apparent that the world, whether conceived as material, real, virtual, etc. marks 
the grounding point for empirical sensation and, as such, adopts the character of that 
which grounds corporeal existence: namely, the body.  
     The enclosure of the aleatory circle demonstrates the rigid structure of corporeal 
ontic experience. The emergence of the event marks the beginning point of an ontic 
encounter that has its ground in sensuous contact with an object of some definition. 
We have provisionally defined the event as the moment of expressive encounter 
within which the subject discovers the real or material world as the base that 
constitutes the mythological apparatus—always relative to the contingency of the 
subject in time and space, and as a quasi-determinate temporal object containing both 
the aleatory moment in its multiplicity and the closure engendered by the 
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philosophical or moral decision. But what dynamics describe the event? What are its 
possible points of contact with the ‘world’ as we have provisionally defined it? What 
characterizes the event relative to a grounded determination of positive value?  
     We have noted that the mythological apparatus contains a serialized form of 
repetitive ontic philosophical or moral decisions, but to this point have neglected the 
question of the genesis of the event in itself. We have tied the notion of the event to 
time and space and to the body and corporeality, but should we consider the body as a 
determinate, necessary ontic entity? Deleuze poses the question in the following 
manner: 
…all bodies are causes in relation to each other, and causes for each 
other—but causes of what? They are causes of certain things of an 
entirely different nature. These effects are not bodies, but, properly 
speaking, “incorporeal” entities. They are not physical qualities and 
properties, but rather logical or dialectical attributes. They are not 
things or facts, but events. We can not say that they exist, but rather 
that they subsist or inhere (having the minimum of being which is 
appropriate to that which is not a thing, a nonexisting entity). They are 
not substantives or adjectives but verbs.89 
Deleuze separates the cause (depth) with the effect (surface), and positions events 
within the process of becoming. As such, Deleuze frees the event from a total 
determination based in the corporeal view. Deleuze continues: 
Incorporeal effects are never themselves causes in relation to each 
other; rather, they are only “quasi-causes” following laws which 
perhaps express in each case the relative unity or mixture of bodies on 
which they depends for their real causes. Thus freedom is preserved in 
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two complimentary manners: once in the interiority of destiny as a 
connection between causes, and once more in the exteriority of events 
as a bond of effects.90  
The event is comprised of a point of sensuous contact wherein the subject encounters 
an indeterminate entity situated in time and space. What provides relevance to the 
subject is an opening of the multiplicity of ontic variation which demands the subject 
to consider a decision in a moral or philosophical manner. The mythological 
apparatus informs the subjective interpretation of an event in two ways: 1) by relating 
the multiplicity of possibility to the precedence of past experience, and 2) by 
informing the subject as to the relevance of the components which comprise the 
aleatory moment. In the case of the dice throw, the basis for the totality of the aleatory 
is contained within a set of given parameters. The number of sides and corresponding 
numerals determine a complete framework of possibility. As such, the mythological 
apparatus is constituted on the basis of pre-set rules that relate the aleatory moment to 
empirical precedent. If, for example, a subject had never encountered a die before, and 
threw five consecutive one throws, we could suppose that the subject would determine 
that the ones were caused each time as an ontic necessity contained within the 
‘essence’ of the throw, not as random chance or a chaotic closure of the possibility for 
variation. We ‘learn’ that the possibility contained in each throw is unique only by 
reconfiguring the mythological apparatus to accept the multiple pursuant to the 
aleatory moment. The dice throw relies on a point of sensuous contact informing the 
subject as to the possibilities contained within the rules of the game, but only via 
repetition and difference. In simple games, the totality of possibility finds correlation 
in the myth apparatus as a simple abstraction. We understand, even if we see just a 
few throws of the dice, and based on the relation of the dice, the rules of the throw, 
and the world of time and space which govern its modalities, that the dice throw 
contains a finite multiplicity of basic proportions. However, as complexity increases, 
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difference has the tendency to overwhelm the subject, forcing the myth apparatus into 
a truncated view of the multiple, amending the myth apparatus into using a series of 
short-hands or shortcuts. It is clear that the rules of the game governing ontic 
existence are significantly more complex than a simple throw of the dice. The myth 
apparatus appears as necessary in order to ‘make sense’ of the world in its complexity. 
The fractured subject cannot contain the multiplicities of ontic possibility within 
which increasing complexity works to undermine the structures of understanding. 
The mythological apparatus represents a defensive matrix—a field of interpretation 
that simultaneously brings ‘understanding’ to the world while also providing a veneer 
of personal cohesion. The self persists as the constitutive and constituted mythological 
apparatus—a serialized, linear, open and closed mode of adopting and rejecting 
variability based on the conjugation of precedence and the value judgments inherent 
to the moral or philosophical decision. 
     We have described the philosophical or moral decision as the ‘completion’ or 
enclosure of the multiplicity contained in the aleatory moment. However, the 
‘outcome’ of an event should not be considered as an absolutely free decision 
undertaken by the subject. As a rule, the framework established by the ‘game’ 
designates a particular type of determinacy. The rules of the game establish a ground 
from which the philosophical or moral decision proceeds. These are quasi-
determinate, incorporeal moments of affirmation. In this way, the subject 
simultaneously creates doxa or good sense based on a quasi-determinate outcome, 
while simultaneously reaffirming the set of ontic rules that constitutes the game in the 
first instance. As such, we observe an ontic doubling which includes the serialization 
of ontic processes along with the re-affirmation of the ontic preconditions 
establishing this dynamic at its very beginning. The origin of the rules of the game 
relies on a designation of the multiple as one of necessity. This necessity, however, in 
its elimination of variables outside its domain, reveals itself as ontic contingency. A 
subject that has never encountered a dice game, for example, would lack any 
conceptual fore-knowledge of the rules governing the multiplicity of outcomes. The 
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subject relies on experience in order to discover a constructed framework within 
which ‘necessity’ is expressed.  
     We return here to the failure of the self-same object to ground the multiplicity of 
possible events. This dynamic is punctuated by an essential lack: it is only through 
discovery of the differences expressed by finite sets of rules that the subject informs 
their conceptual framework, constituting an imaginative understanding of possibility 
that supposes complete determinacy where only quasi-determinacy persists. On the 
concept of structure, Deleuze notes: “It is thus pleasing that there resounds today the 
news that sense is never a principle or an origin, but that it is produced. It is not 
something to discover, to restore, and to re-employ; it is something to produce by new 
machinery.”91     
     Whatever the world is, as a real or virtual totality or framework, it seems to present 
phenomenally to the ‘subject’. That which forces us to think also forces us to the 
philosophical decision. This mode, however, does not in itself present the world as a 
complex, yet knowable totality. If anything, the contingent nature of the encounter 
with respect to corporeality demonstrates the chaotic nature underwriting pure ontic 
possibility. Exposed as a series of aleatory possibilities, the empirical event situates the 
corporeal subject within its necessary ontic modes: time and space. The concept of the 
encounter is intimately tied with that of expression. That which forces us to think 
denotes a set of determinations that are supposed to exist independently of the 
subjective view. As Deleuze characterizes it: 
On the one hand, events-effects maintain a relation of causality with 
their physical causes, without this relation being one of necessity; it is 
rather a relation of expression. On the other hand, they have between 
them, or with their ideational quasi-cause, no longer a relation of 
 
91 Ibid., 72. 
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causality, but rather, once again and this time exclusively, a relation of 
expression.92 
Despite the expansions and contractions of the relative nature of time and 
autonomous ‘experiences’ of space, likely at least two ontic universals persist with 
respect to human existence: The first is the linear nature of the experience of time. 
Despite debates regarding memory, repetition, anamnesis, the eternal return, etc., it 
seems likely that the concept of linear time is a necessary supposition with respect to 
corporeal inquiry. The second ontic universal is the consciousness of space and time 
as they conjugate into empirical events, thus forming the basis for the aleatory 
moment and its moral completion. As noted above, the enclosure of the aleatory circle 
is an ontic necessity. The gambler, for instance, cannot not throw the dice, lest he or 
she walk away from the game in its entirety. It is here, perhaps, we encounter 
Heidegger’s looking away formulation. It is only in the dynamic looking away (from 
the ontic) that the ‘subject’ glimpses the ‘world’ (the game) in its entirety. As Deleuze 
characterizes it: “The philosopher takes the side of the idiot as though of a man 
without presuppositions”.93 Could we read the refusal to confront the aleatory 
moment as an abject rejection of the ontic game? Perhaps the gambler is the comedian 
of the ontic parlay, whereas the recluse encounters an element of the sublime? 
Recalling that Kant defined the sublime as that sensation which overcomes the subject 
on realization of the unbridgeable gap between the subject and nature, might the 
recluse mark a mode of subjective resistance to this dynamic in its entirety? The 
ascetic mode may be one of non-attunement to the ontic world.  
     The mythological apparatus is grounded in the enclosure of ontic serializations. It 
is both constituting and constitutive, responding to the ‘world’ and forming the basis 
of the ‘subject.’ The subject should not be understood as substance—as a cohesive 
totality in itself, reaching out in to a chaotic world. The complex totality of the subject 
 
92 Ibid., 169-170. 
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is none other than the synthetic cohesion of the mythological apparatus in its ontic 
mode. The world designates the situating of the fractured subject within a set of ontic 
circumstances governed by time and space, yet always open to the conditions of the 
possible found within the multiplicity of the aleatory moment. The ontological, 
alternatively foreclosed on as unobservable, unmeasurable, unquantifiable, etc., 
designates the possibility of the infinite, of authentic unity, or of the completion of the 
fractured I with respect to Being. As Nancy remarks: “What is born has no form, nor it 
is the fundament that is born. “To be born is rather to transform, transport, and 
entrance all determinations.”94  
     We observe two dynamics with respect to Being: 1) God, as the allegorical concept 
of completed Being, stands for a synthetic unity of ontic concepts—ideations which 
persist outside the ontic necessities of time and space, and 2) God as the ontological 
concept of all possibility—of completed Being which persists in its indeterminacy 
ahead of the multiplicity of the aleatory moment as well as the philosophical or moral 
decisions whose repetitions form the mythological apparatus. In the former 
conception, God operates in a determinate mode—giving rise to modalities of the 
event and the providing a basis for the value judgments inherent to the philosophical 
or moral decision. In the latter conception, God adopts the quality of the 
indeterminate, of the chaosmos or of the non-ground.95 
     We may not be able to chart the flows of ontic experience back to primordial Being 
and the world itself, but we can mark the conditions of possibility that allow the 
human subject to glimpse the ontological all possible. It is only through the complex 
interactions formed within the ontic world, and the subject persisting within its 
governing structures, that allow for a concept of total unity to emerge. If there is any 
substance to Lévi-Strauss’ claim—that originary myths persist across culture and thus 
demonstrate a structural (ontic necessity)—perhaps the allegory of the fall of man 
 
94 (Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 3) 
95 Cf. (FWJ Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, p.69) 
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points to an original lack, or negative, which births the concept of God and of a world 
of complete Being over and above what appears to be the case: the world is a 
construction drawn together from a field of chaos, a unity of corporeal experience 
with a repetitive, constituted and constitutive mythological apparatus expressing 
meaning as a reflection of the moral and philosophical affirmations of the subject.  
Conclusion: The Myth of the Eternal Return  
We have focused primarily on the concept of ‘world’—its possible form, exigencies, 
and the implications for a new philosophy of mythology. Chapter One introduced the 
concept of world critical to an understanding of the metaphysical and cultural 
apparatuses informing the modern era. Chapter Two separated the concept of world 
into two distinct conceptualizations: that of a totalized, necessary whole, and that of a 
chaotic series punctuated only by events, situating the mythological apparatus within 
the dynamic of the aleatory circle. 
     Rather than conclude with an approach to the concept of mythology from the dual 
perspectives of whole/chaos, we will instead accept the world as ‘given’—as an 
ontically necessary object within which subjective meaning persists. Following 
Deleuze, we characterized the event as an incorporeal ‘quasi-caused’ phenomena, 
grounded in forces the subject encounters in a chaotic world. As such, the event 
describes a phantasm: “It describes as such to an ideational surface over which it is 
produced as an effect. It transcends inside and outside since its topological property is 
to bring “its” internal and external sides into contact, in order for them to unfold onto 
a single side.”96 The event is characterized by a point of phenomenal contact with an 
ontic multiplicity that we have referred to as the aleatory point or the opening of the 
ontic multiple. The event also contains the necessary ontic foreclosure of the aleatory 
or multiple point of contact through what we have referred to as the moral or 
philosophical decision—a closing of the multiple in favor of the singular. We 
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positioned the mythological apparatus as an ontic framework or ruleset that is 
constituted as a series of historical ‘outcomes’ of the foreclosure of the aleatory circle, 
but also as a constituting frame preceding the subject in the guise of the return of the 
same. We have described, in a preliminary way, the genesis of the event as an ontic 
given—a series of chaotic, yet existent, points of contact where time, space, and the 
body (corporeality) meet at the subject position. Despite the incorporeal character of 
the event, we observe that the world, whatever its conception, must act as the basis or 
(quasi) cause of the event as such. In the absence of world, no ontic understanding is 
possible, and no ontological inquiry may proceed. In Chapter Two we described the 
mythological apparatus as an ontic frame that serves to capture repetition (as doxa, or 
good sense) as a series of “best practices” that exclude the ontic multiple.  
     The question for a new philosophy of mythology is to interrogate the conditions of 
the event in its relation to the master concept of Being. We can provisionally define 
Being as the essence of meaning—a self-same real-existing ontological object. Objects 
that persist in the world lack Being as an essential characteristic—they are simulacra 
that, according to Deleuze are “those systems in which different relates to different by 
means of difference itself.”97 Two philosophical errors describe the essence of Being: 1) 
as the ground that provides meaning to real-existing objects within the world, and 2) 
as the necessary whole of the world from which the contingency of particulars 
emanates. On our view, Being can only describe meaning in its most fundamental 
form: as the unity of a necessary self-same property that ‘completes’ the fracture of the 
world. We have derivatives of meaning describing ontic objects, but not Being. We 
also have a type of meaning derived from sense, which represents the play of the 
surface: language games or formal logic. Meaning, in its grandest conception, must be 
understood as a fundamental, existential or phenomenal thing whose essence is self-
expressive and infinite, immobile and immemorial. Philosophy errs when it looks for 
Being in physical properties of material or ‘real’ objects. Likewise, when philosophy 
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seeks the essence of the forces (causes) that underwrite the phenomena (effects) 
(alternatively ‘depth’/’surface’) it misses the fundamental character of meaning and of 
Being itself.  
      We have described the glimpse into the ontological all possible as a primary 
characteristic of the aleatory circle, but a description of the conditions for the 
ontological all possible is not adequate to a description of Being as such. The glimpse 
of the ontological all possible expressed in the structure of the aleatory circle is only 
an opening that operates negatively on the ontic multiple. This negative is not a 
determinate negation—it does not contain a logical affirmation from which ontic 
particulars flow. Likewise, this negative is not a cognitive process proceeding to a 
complete, ideal product. Instead, the negative of the ontological all possible is chaos. 
Chaos gives definition to the false unity of the essence of the same. It is the destruction 
of the eternal return of the same and of meaningful repetition. Chaos is the ontological 
all possible without depth. It is the background to the ‘noise’ of the surface and to 
representation. The aleatory circle, persisting in the event, catches sight of the all 
possible as an opening—as the destruction of the rules which govern the ontic game. 
     The glimpse of the ontological all possible is both a blessing and a tyranny. In its 
absence, the subject falls into the ontic world—a world of paradox, of positive 
affirmation grounded only in a belief in the necessity of time, space, and the body. In 
glimpsing the ontological all possible, the subject comes to understand the limitless 
nature of existence brought finite in its corporeal mode. In this sense, the ontological 
acts as an ironic negative from which various philosophical or moral positions 
emerge: nihilism, cynicism, and stoicism. Likewise, the ontological all possible affords 
theological thought its founding doxa. Unity of the subject against ontological chaos 
allegorizes the primal will of the creator. The proper name of God stands for that 
which cannot exist in the ontic game: infinite unity. This logic relies on chaos as a 
determinate negation of that which is supposed to persist. Against all empirical 
observation, the unity of the subject is taken as a necessary ontological object from 
which emanates the fundamental meaning of Being as such. 
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     The subject relies on repetition in grounding the theological apparatus. Here, 
mythology adopts a doxa of another type. In Deleuze’s work on time he describes 
Aion as “the past-future, which in an infinite subdivision of the abstract moment 
endlessly decomposes itself in both directions at once and forever sidesteps the 
present.”98 He describes Chronos as “the present which alone exists.”99 Repetition 
persists only with the present, within Chronos. Aion is the break—the fracture that 
disrupts the present and forces linear repetition. It appears that the nature of the 
subject is binary, existing in two places at once. The present moment is a conjugation 
of past, present, and future—an incomplete whole grounded only in meaningful 
repetition. A critique of the metaphysics of presence amounts to a dissolution of the 
unity of the subject as a coherent totality with respect to the conjugation of time and 
space. There is no expression of subject other than as the fractured meeting point of 
time, space, and body. Aion is simultaneously the creator and the destroyer—the 
moment of conflict that disrupts the ideal unity of the subject while also creating the 
groundless firmament on which the subject stands. Deleuze notes: 
It is the decentered center which traces between the series, and for all 
disjunctions, the merciless straight line of the Aion, that is, the distance 
whereupon the castoffs of the self, the world, and God are lined up: the 
Grand Canyon of the world, the “crack” of the self, and the 
dismembering of God.100 
That which calls the subject to Being is already the creation of its impossibility. As 
with the aleatory circle, Aion forces the enclosure of repetition back into the tyranny 
of the present.  
     A subject who speaks of ‘being present’ refers to close proximity with a 
mythological apparatus rich in repetition. This apparatus has its ground in the 
 
98 (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 77) 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid., 176. 
 68 
conjugation of ontic ‘rulings’ with representation and reflection. Representation is the 
image of thought that proceeds from sensuous contact—a mediating mechanism that 
offers short-hand understandings of ontic modalities. The positive affirmation of 
sensuous experience adopts the form of metonymy, metaphor, or allegory, prompting 
a synthetic deduction ascertained in the moment of reflection. Deleuze writes, “A 
representation on its own is not enough to form knowledge. In order to know 
something, we need not only to have a representation, but to be able to go beyond 
it…”101 This beyond is the point of synthesis which binds together representation with 
reflection. What lacks in the proper name finds apotheosis in the conjugation of 
partial objects. In this sense, a positive thing becomes an object of representation 
through its encounter with that which it is not. The subject of representation mixes 
the flux of difference with historical precedent in order to make sense of the world in a 
concrete manner. Incommensurate Ideas grounded in representation are endemic to a 
formal system of thought that lacks a determinate grounding mechanism. As such, the 
mythological apparatus that ‘represents’ the rules of the ontic game tends to abort 
incoherent Ideas in favor of a serialized heterogeneous framework within which 
“correct” representations are contained. Reason tends to intervene on behalf of value 
judgments in order to rationalize the myth apparatus. Hence, doxa or good sense is 
always laden with a moral imposition of indeterminate grounding. Vacillations within 
ontic representation are given secondary status to a set of master predicates, from 
which the frame of the world takes shape. Here we observe the return of the picture of 
the world as an ontological whole, one expressing its necessities in a coherent manner. 
In this scheme, the subject need only fine-tune its mythological frame in adaptation to 
the ‘world’ of repetitive ontic events. 
     The reduction of ontic multiplicity to serialized repetitions affords the subject a 
brand of cultural primacy over the ‘world.’ What presents as mastery is nothing more 
than false unity—a means by which the subject eliminates ‘non-sense’ or ‘irrelevant 
 
101 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: 
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details’ from the mythological apparatus. Paradoxical or ‘nonsensical’ phenomena 
which fail to cohere with the unity provided by the mythological apparatus are given 
secondary ontic status—leftovers of an ever-greater teleological endeavor.  
     Invariably described as illusions or fantasies, ‘mythological’ thinking is defined 
through its relation to a pre-supposed, objective reality. As outlined in Chapter Two, 
the adherence to a supposition of a totalized, necessary and knowable world has 
positioned mythological thought outside the realm of meaningful understanding. 
Likewise, in a concept of the world as fractured and chaotic, mythologies become 
ideational repetitions, grounded in the ‘best practices’ of corporeality. There is a third 
form of myth that bears very little relation to the world as such, insofar as we 
understand world as the background within which subjective meaning persists. This 
variety of myth is deeply personal, mystic, or borne of the other. It is, in our 
conception, the eternal return that lacks an essential grounding property in the self-
Same or original. Philosophy and the natural sciences generally circle the question of 
ground as the starting point for the construction of a framework of analysis. In the 
existentialist and phenomenological traditions of philosophy, however, what is given 
in thought as a relation to phenomena is elevated to a higher status. As Merleau-Ponty 
notes on the illusions of subjectivity:  
…he must appeal beyond them to himself who is their titular and 
therefore must know what motivates them from within; he must lose 
them as a state of fact in order to reconstruct them as his own 
possibilities, in order to learn from himself what they mean in truth, 
what delivers him over to both perception and to phantasms—in a 
word, he must reflect.102 
 
102 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
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Classically conceived, reflection brings together the expressed with the representation 
as a synthesis that comprises the subject. It is supposed that the Same returns, as a 
knowable ground whose properties are brought into synthesis by way of the faculties 
of cognition. But what is reflected is a mirror of repetition. If the world is a given, then 
it follows that what is ontically ‘necessary’ finds its proper place within the subject. In 
this sense, the expressive quality of the world finds its correlate through a proper 
methodology. Repetition is the pattern of that which persists in time. It is corporeally 
bound, subject to the conditions of space and physiological ‘necessity.’ It is the not the 
eternal return of the Same but the ideal synthesis of ontic contingency playing out 
through the conditions of time and space. The myth of the eternal return is the myth 
of the repetition of phenomena in their idealized, unconditioned form. It is supposed 
that the eternal return illuminates the forces that underwrite phenomenal repetition, 
but as Deleuze notes of mechanism: 
Why is mechanism such a bad interpretation of the eternal return? 
Because it does not necessarily or directly imply the eternal return. 
Because it only entails the false consequence of a final state. This final 
state is held to be identical to the initial state and, to this extent, it is 
concluded that the mechanical process passes through the same set of 
differences again.103 
It is the ontic multiple with births the mythological apparatus through the necessary 
foreclosure of the conditions of possibility contained in multiplicity. The eternal 
return represents another ruling—a mythical repetition within which ontic difference 
is subordinated to the logic of the Same, the logic of the world as a necessary totality 
expressing its existent properties. The eternal return is sense of another type, bringing 
unity to the non-sense that precedes ontic multiplicity. What returns eternally, in our 
view, is the ontological all possible, illuminated by the destruction of the ontic 
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multiple and by the expression of time, space, and corporeality as ontically contingent 
phenomena grounded solely in subjective sense.    
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